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Abstract
We study decentralized colleges admissions in the face of uncertain student preferences. En-
rollment uncertainty causes colleges to strategically target their admissions, forgoing students
sought after by others and seeking students overlooked by others. When students’ types are
multidimensional, colleges avoid head-on competition by placing excessive weights on less cor-
related dimensions. Restricting the number of applications or allowing for wait-listing alleviates
enrollment uncertainty, but the resulting assignments of decentralized matching are inefficient
and unfair. A centralized matching via Gale and Shapley’s deferred acceptance algorithm attains
efficiency and fairness, but some colleges can be worse off relative to decentralized matching.
1 Introduction
The standard market design research on matching focuses on how best to design a centralized
matching mechanism, taking the societal consensus on centralization as a given. While such a con-
sensus exists in a number of markets (e.g., medical residency matching and public school matching),
many markets remain decentralized with college admissions and graduate school admissions being
notable cases in point. Decentralized markets often exhibit congestion and do not operate effi-
ciently (Roth and Xing, 1997). Although it is widely believed that these markets will benefit from
improved coordination or centralization, it is not well understood why they remain decentralized
and what welfare benefits would be gained by improving coordination possibly via a centralized
clearinghouse.
At least part of the problem is the lack of an analytical grasp of decentralized matching markets.
Often treated as a black box, the equilibrium and welfare implications of decentralized matching
markets have not been understood well in the literature. Indeed, we have yet to develop a workhorse
model of decentralized matching that could serve as a useful benchmark for comparison with a
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and Finance, Hanyang University, youngwoo.koh@gmail.com
centralized system.1
The current paper develops an analytical framework for understanding decentralized matching
markets in the context of college admissions. In many countries, such as Japan, Korea, and the
US, college admissions are organized similarly to decentralized labor markets, with exploding and
binding admissions made by schools during a short window of time, among other things.
With limited offers and acceptances to clear the markets, decentralized matching provides only a
limited chance for colleges to learn students’ preferences and to condition their admission decisions
on them. This presents a challenge for colleges in managing its yield. Inability to forecast yield
accurately could result in too many or too few students enrolling in a college relative to its capacity.
Either mistake is costly. For instance, 1,415 freshmen accepted Yale’s invitation to join its incoming
class in 1995-96, although the university had aimed for a class of 1,335. At the same year, Princeton
also reported 1,100 entering students, the largest in its history. The college set up mobile homes
in fields and built new dorms to accommodate the students (Avery, Fairbanks and Zeckhauser,
2003).2
The yield management problem becomes increasingly important in many countries. In Korea,
for example, students apply for departments and not for colleges. Since each department has a
small quota and there are many potential choices for students, it is critical for departments to
predict yield rates accurately to ensure that they fill their capacities. The US colleges have recently
experienced a dramatic increase in applications they receive, in part due to the introduction of
common applications (which reduced the application cost).3 As a consequence, the average yield
rate of four-year colleges in the US has declined significantly over the past decade, from 49 percent
in 2001 to 38 percent in 2011 (Clinedinst, Hurley and Hawkins, 2012). Declining rates signal greatly
increased uncertainty for colleges:
Trying to hit those numbers is like trying to hit hot tub when you are skydiving
30,000 feet. I’m going to go to church every day in April. – Jennifer Delahunty (Dean
of admissions and financial aid at Kenyon College in Ohio)4
Importantly, the uncertainty facing a college with respect to an admitted student’s enrollment
depends not just on the student’s preference but also on what other set of admissions she receives.
1The main exceptions are two excellent works by Chade and Smith (2006) and Chade, Lewis and Smith (2011).
As we discuss more fully later, they focus on the portfolio decisions students face in application and colleges’ inference
of students’ abilities based on imperfect signals. By contrast, the current paper focuses on the matching implications
of college admissions, paying special attention to the yield management problem arising from (aggregately) uncertain
students’ preferences.
2The cost may also take the form of an explicit sanction imposed on the admitting unit (e.g., department) by the
government (as in Korea) or by the college (as in Australia).
3The average number of applications per institution increased 60 percent between 2002 and 2011. Seventy-nine
percent of Fall 2011 freshmen applied to three or more colleges and twenty-nine percent of them submitted seven or
more applications. (Clinedinst, Hurley and Hawkins, 2012)
4“In Shifting Era of Admissions, Colleges Sweat,” NY Times, March 8, 2009
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This makes a college’s admission policy a strategic tool for managing its yield. We provide a simple
model of colleges’ strategic admissions game and characterize its equilibrium. The explicit analysis
of equilibrium allows us to evaluate the resulting assignment in terms of welfare and fairness and to
compare this with outcomes that arise from other coordinated admissions and centralized matching.
In our baseline model, there are two colleges, each with limited capacity, and a unit mass of
students with “scores” that are common for both colleges (e.g., high school GPA or SAT scores).
Students apply to colleges at no cost. Colleges prefer students according to their scores, but they
do not know students’ preferences toward them. This uncertainty takes an aggregate form: The
mass of students preferring one college over the other varies across states that are unknown to the
colleges. Over-enrollment costs a college in proportion to the enrollment in excess of its capacity.
Our baseline model involves a simple time line: Initially, students simultaneously apply to colleges.
Each college observes only the scores of those students who apply to it. Next, the two colleges
simultaneously offer admissions to sets of students. Finally, the students who are admitted by
either or both colleges decide on which admission they accept.
Given that application is costless, students have a (weak) dominant strategy of applying to
both colleges. Hence, the main focus of the analysis is the college’s admission decisions. Our main
finding is that the colleges engage in “strategic targeting”: In equilibrium, each college may forgo
good students who are sought after by the other college and may admit less attractive students
who appear overlooked by the other college. The reason for this is that the students who attract
competing admissions from the other college present greater enrollment uncertainty and add to
capacity cost. Randomization in admissions for students may also emerge. We then provide
existence of these equilibria. Next, we show that the assignment is typically unfair; that is, it
entails justified envy among students and fails to achieve efficiency among students, among colleges
and among all parties including colleges and students.
These results can be illustrated via a simple example. Suppose there are only two students, 1
and 2, applying to colleges A and B. Each college has one seat to fill and faces a prohibitively high
cost of having two students. Student i has score vi, i = 1, 2, where 0 < v2 < v1 < 2v2. Each student
has an equal probability of preferring either school, which is private information (unknown to the
other student and to the colleges). Each college values having student i at vi. The applications are
free of cost, and the timing is the same as that explained above.
Given the large cost of over-enrollment, each college admits only one student. Their payoffs are
described as follow.









This game has a battle of the sexes’ structure (with asymmetric payoffs), so there are two
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different types of equilibria. First, there are two asymmetric pure-strategy equilibria in which one
college admits student 1 and the other admits student 2. There is also a mixed-strategy equilibrium
in which each college admits 1 with probability γ := 2v1−v2v1+v2 > 1/2 and admits 2 with probability
1−γ, where γ is chosen such that the other college is indifferent. Both types of equilibria show the
pattern of strategic targeting. In the pure-strategy equilibria, colleges manage to avoid competition
and thus randomness in enrollment by targeting different students. The mixed-strategy equilibrium
also arises from the targeting motive, i.e., colleges’ attempt to avoid students sought after by the
other, although it does not result in perfect coordination.
This example, while extremely simple, suggests problems with decentralized matching in terms
of welfare and fairness. First, the student with high score (student 1) may go to a less preferred
school (in both types of equilibria) even though both colleges prefer that student; that is, justified
envy arises. Second, it could be the case that student 1 prefers A and student 2 prefers B, but the
former is assigned B and the latter is assigned A, showing that the equilibrium outcome is inefficient
among students. Lastly, the mixed-strategy equilibrium is Pareto inefficient because both colleges
may admit the same student, and it would be Pareto improving for the unmatched college to match
with the other student.
We next study the admissions problem when students have multidimensional types. Some mea-
sures, such as students’ academic performances or system-wide test like SAT, are highly correlated
among colleges, but others measures, such as students’ college-specific essays and tests or their
extracurricular activities, are less correlated among them. Clinedinst, Hurley and Hawkins (2012)
report that private colleges place emphasis on many factors other than standard test scores, in-
cluding essay/writing samples and extracurricular activities. We show that colleges’ desire to avoid
head-on competition, and thus to lessen enrollment uncertainty, leads them to bias their evaluation
toward less correlated measures by placing excessive weights on theses dimensions.
We also study two common ways for colleges to alleviate enrollment uncertainty. One is to
restrict the number of applications each student can submit. This form of coordination is observed
in many countries; for instance, students in the UK cannot apply to both Cambridge and Oxford,
students in Japan can apply to at most one public university, and students in Korea face a similar
restriction. Restricted application reduces enrollment uncertainty for the colleges, and thus allevi-
ates their yield management burden. Yet, we show that this method may not completely eliminate
the yield management problem and justified envy, and it may also fail to achieve efficiency.
Colleges also seek to cope with enrollment uncertainty by admitting students in sequence, or
“wait-listing”: Some students are admitted outright and others are placed in a wait list in each of
multiple rounds, and some students in the wait list are later admitted when some offers are declined
and seats open up. This method is also observed in many countries, including France, Korea and
the US. Wait-listing alleviates colleges’ yield management problem, since colleges may adjust their
admission offers based on the students’ acceptance behavior and the information they may learn
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over the course of the process. We show, however, that they still engage in strategic targeting by
admitting “non-contiguous” set of students in scores, and the welfare and fairness problems still
remain. The predicted pattern of equilibrium is observed in the admissions data from Hanyang
university in Korea. See Section 6.
Finally, we consider centralized matching via Gale and Shapley’s Deferred Acceptance algorithm
(DA in short). This eliminates colleges’ yield management problem and justified envy completely
and attains efficiency. At the same time, it is possible for a college to be worse off relative to the
decentralized matching. For instance, in the above example, suppose a pure-strategy equilibrium
in which college i always gets student 1 is played. Then, that college will clearly be worse off from
a switch to a centralization via DA because it will not always attract student 1. This may explain a
possible lack of consensus toward centralization and may underscore why college admissions remain
decentralized in many countries.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1.1 discusses the related literature. The model is
introduced in Section 2. Equilibrium characterization and its existence are established in Section 3.
Section 3.1 discusses welfare and fairness implications of equilibria. Section 4 studies admissions
problem when students’ types are multidimensional. In Section 5, restriction on the number of
applications is studied, and in Section 6, wait-listing is studied. Centralized matching via DA is
considered in Section 7. Section 8 concludes the paper. Proofs are provided in the Appendix unless
stated otherwise. The Appendix also extends the baseline model to allow for more than two colleges
and shows that our analysis in the two-college model carries over.
1.1 Related Literature
Several papers in the matching literature have considered decentralized matching markets. Roth
and Xing (1997) study the entry-level market for clinical psychologists in which firms make offers
to workers sequentially within a day and workers can accept, reject or hold an offer. They find that,
mainly based on simulations, such a decentralized (but coordinated) market exhibits congestion,
i.e., not enough offers and acceptances could be made to clear the market, and the resulting outcome
is unstable. Neiderle and Yariv (2009) study a decentralized one-to-one matching market in which
firms make offers sequentially through multiple periods. They provide sufficient conditions under
which such decentralized markets generate stable outcomes in equilibrium in the presence of market
friction (namely, time discounting) and preference uncertainty. Coles, Kushnir and Neiderle (2013)
also consider one-to-one matching in decentralized markets and show that introducing a signaling
device alleviates congestion and increases welfare in terms of the number of matches and the workers’
payoffs.
Like these models, our model concerns the consequence of congestion arising from decentralized
matching, but unlike Roth and Xing (1997), we study participants’ strategic responses, by analyzing
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colleges’ admissions decisions and their welfare and fairness implications. This framework identifies
strategic targeting as an important new implication of decentralized matching. Moreover, the
explicit analysis of equilibria permits a clear comparison with the outcome that would arise from a
centralized matching.
The college admissions problem has recently received attention in the economics literature.
Chade and Smith (2006) study students’ application decision as a portfolio choice problem. Chade,
Lewis and Smith (2011) analyze colleges’ admission decisions together with the students’ application
decisions. In their model, students with heterogeneous abilities make application decisions subject
to application costs, and colleges set admission standards based on noisy signals on students’
abilities. Avery and Levin (2010) and Lee (2009) study early admissions. Unlike our model, these
models have no aggregate uncertainty with respect to students’ preferences, so colleges face no
enrollment uncertainty in these models. Hence, colleges do not employ strategic targeting; they
instead use cutoff strategies.
Some aspects of our equilibrium are related to political lobbying behavior studied by Lizzeri
and Persico (2001, 2005). Just as colleges target students in our model, politicians in these models
target voters in distributing their favors. In their models, voters are homogeneous, and a voter
votes for the candidate that offers her the largest favor. In our model, however, students have
heterogeneous abilities and preferences. Thus, colleges’ admission decisions are more complicated—
admission probabilities vary according to students’ scores. Aggregate uncertainty plays a unique
role in shaping competition in our model, whereas how the spoils of office are split among candidate
(either winner-take-all or proportional rule) is crucial in their model.
Our model also shares some similarities with directed search models, such as Montgomery (1991)
and Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001). In these studies, each firm (seller) posts a wage (price), and
each worker (buyer) decides which job to apply for. Firms have a fixed number of job openings and
cannot hire more than the capacity, and workers can only apply to one firm. Workers’ inability
to precisely coordinate their search decisions causes a “search friction,” so they randomize on
application decisions. Just like the workers in these models, colleges in our model can be seen to
engage in “directed searches” on students. The difference is that the colleges in our model offer
admissions to many students subject to aggregate uncertainty. This leads to strategic targeting, a
novel feature of our model.
2 Model
There is a unit mass of students with score v distributed from V ≡ [0, 1] according to an absolutely
continuous distribution G(·). There are two colleges, A and B, each with capacity κ < 12 .
5 Each
5Appendix B will extend the model to include more than two colleges, showing that our main results carry over
to that extension.
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college values a student with score v at v and faces a cost λ ≥ 1 for each incremental enrollment
exceeding the quota.6 Each student has a preference over the two colleges, which is private infor-
mation. A state of nature s, drawn from [0, 1] according to the uniform distribution, determines the
fraction of students who prefer A over B. In state s, a fraction µ(s) ∈ [0, 1] of students prefers A
to B, where µ(·) is strictly increasing and continuous in s.7 While we shall consider a general form
of µ(·), for some result, we will consider a symmetric environment in which µ(s) = 1−µ(1− s)
for all s ∈ [0, 1]. In a symmetric environment, the measure of students who prefer A over B is
symmetric around s = 12 .
The timing of the game is as follows. First, Nature draws the (aggregate uncertainty) state s.
Next, all students simultaneously apply to colleges. Each college observes the scores of only those
students who apply to it, and based on the scores, colleges simultaneously decide which applicants
to admit. Last, students who have received at least one admission offer decide which offer to accept.
We assume that there is no application cost for the students, so it is a weak dominant strategy
for each student to apply to both colleges. Throughout this paper, we focus on a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium in which students play the weak dominant strategy.8
Colleges distribute admissions based on students’ scores. Let σi : V → [0, 1], i = A,B, be
college i’s admission strategy in terms of the fraction of students with score v that the college
admits. For given σi(·), let Vi := {v ∈ [0, 1] |σi(v) > 0} be the types of students college i admits.
Let VAB := VA ∩ VB. If VAB has a positive measure in an equilibrium, this means that a positive
measure of students has admissions from both colleges. We call such an equilibrium competitive.
An equilibrium in which VAB has zero measure is called non-competitive.
Consider the students with score v. A fraction σi(v) (1− σj(v)) of them, where i, j = A,B and
i 6= j, is admitted only by college i, and a fraction σi(v)σj(v) of them is admitted by both colleges.
The former group accepts i’s admissions, but only a fraction µi(s) of the latter group accepts i’s
offer, where µi(s) = µ(s) if i = A and µi(s) = 1 − µ(s) if i = B. Thus, the mass of students who




σi(v) (1− σj(v) + µi(s)σj(v)) dG(v). (2.1)
Each college enjoys the scores of enrolled students as its gross payoff and incurs cost λ for each
6The common preference assumption is later relaxed when we allow colleges to consider students’ attributes that
are imperfectly correlated. See Section 4.
7There is no loss of generality to assume the uniform distribution, because for a distribution F (·) of s, we can
simply relabel s, and the popularity of a college over the other is captured by µ(·).
8The strategy of applying to both colleges can be made a strictly dominant strategy if students have some
uncertainty about their scores, which is realistic in case the scores are either not publicly observable or depend on
multiple dimensions of attributes, the weighting of which may be unknown to the students.
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vσi(v) (1− σj(v) + µi(s)σj(v)) dG(v)− λmax{mi(s)− κ, 0}
]
.
One immediate observation is that each college’s payoff is concave in its own admission strategy;
that is, πi(ησi+(1−η)σ′i) ≥ η πi(σi)+(1−η)πi(σ′i) for any feasible strategies σi and σ′i and for any
η ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore, mixing over σi’s is unprofitable for college i. For this reason, any equilibrium
is characterized by a pair (σA, σB). Of course, this does not mean that the equilibrium is in pure-
strategies; the values of σA and σB may be strictly interior, in which case the admission strategies
would involve randomization.
In the following section, we characterize different types of equilibria and establish their existence.
We then provide welfare and fairness properties of equilibria.
3 Characterization of Equilibria
We analyze colleges’ admission decisions in this section. To this end, we fix any equilibrium (σA, σB)
and explore the properties it must satisfy. Later, we shall establish existence of the equilibria. We
begin with the following observations, whose proofs are in Appendix A.1.
Lemma 1. In any equilibrium (σA, σB), the following results hold.
(i) mA(0) ≤ κ ≤ mA(1) and mB(1) ≤ κ ≤ mB(0).
(ii) VA ∪ VB is a connected interval with sup{VA ∪ VB} = 1 and inf{VA ∪ VB} > 0.
(iii) If the equilibrium is competitive (i.e., VAB has a positive measure), then there exists a
unique (ŝA, ŝB) ∈ (0, 1)2 such that mA(ŝA) = κ and mB(ŝB) = κ.
(iv) If the equilibrium is non-competitive (i.e., VAB has zero measure), then mA(s) = mB(s) = κ
for all s ∈ [0, 1]. Further, almost every student with v ≥ G−1(1 − 2κ) receives an admission offer
from exactly one college.
Part (i) of the lemma states that in equilibrium, colleges cannot have strict over-enrollment
or strict under-enrollment in all states. This is obvious since if there were over-enrollment in all
states for a college, then since λ ≥ 1, it will profitably deviate by rejecting some students with
v < 1, and if there were under-enrollment in all states, a college will likewise profitably deviate by
accepting more students. Part (ii) suggests that if a student with score v is admitted by either
college, then all students with scores higher than such v must be admitted by some college at least
with positive probability, and there is a positive mass of students in the low tail who are never
admitted by either college. Part (iii) suggests that in a competitive equilibrium, the colleges will
suffer from under-enrollment in some states and over-enrollment in other states. This is intuitive
since given (aggregately) uncertain preferences on the part of students, the presence of students
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who receive admissions from both colleges presents non-trivial enrollment uncertainty. Each college
will deal with uncertainty by optimally trading off the cost of over-enrollment with the loss from
under-enrollment, thus entailing both types of mistakes depending on the states. Part (iv) states
that in a non-competitive equilibrium, colleges avoid the over- and under-enrollment problems, and
almost every top 2κ students receive admissions from only one college. This is, again, intuitive since
the colleges in this case face no enrollment uncertainty, so they will fill their capacities exactly in
all states with students whose scores are within the top 2κ.
In what follows, we shall focus on competitive equilibria. There are several reasons for this. It
will be seen that competitive equilibria always exist (see Theorem 2). By contrast, non-competitive
equilibria can be ruled out if either λ is not too large or κ is not too small (see Appendix A.2).
Finally, even if a noncompetitive equilibrium exists, the characterization provided in Lemma 1-(iv)
is sufficient for our welfare and fairness statements, as will be seen later.
Fix any competitive equilibrium (σA, σB). For ease of notation, let SA := {s | s ≥ ŝA} and
SB := {s | s ≤ ŝB} be the sets of states that the colleges are over-enrolled. It is convenient to
















σi(v)Hi(v, β(v)) dG(v) + λκProb(s ∈ Si)
where
Hi(v, σj(v)) := v
(
1− σj(v) + E[µi(s)]σj(v)
)
− λProb(s ∈ Si)
(
1− σj(v) + E[µi(s)|s ∈ Si]σj(v)
)
is college i’s marginal payoff from admitting a student with score v for given ŝi and σj(·)10 in
equilibrium. Hi captures college i’s local incentive; that is, what the college gains by admitting v,
holding fixed its opponent’s decision and its own decisions for the rest of the students at σi(·).
Lemma 2. A strategy profile (σA, σB) is a competitive equilibrium if and only if (i) Hi(v, σj(v)) > 0
implies σi(v) = 1, (ii) Hi(v, σj(v)) < 0 implies σi(v) = 0, (iii) Hi(v, σj(v)) = 0 implies σi(v) ∈
[0, 1], where i, j = A,B and j 6= i.
Proof. See Appendix A.3. 
Lemma 2 states that in equilibrium, each college admits students if their marginal payoffs are
positive and rejects them if their marginal payoffs are negative. This lemma also suggests that a
strategy profile satisfying the stated conditions forms an equilibrium. Note that these conditions
ensure marginal incentive compatibility: that is, each college has no incentive to deviate its decision
9Prob(s ∈ SA) = 1− ŝA and Prob(s ∈ SB) = ŝB (by the assumption of the uniform distribution).
10We shall suppress its dependence on ŝi unless it is important.
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0 vi vi v
“Not Admit” “Admit”“Admit only if j does not”
Hi(v, 0) < 0 Hi(v, 1) > 0Hi(v, 1) < 0 < Hi(v, 0)
Figure 3.1: College i’s Admission Decision
on a given student, holding fixed it own admissions decisions on all other students. Even with these
conditions satisfied, a college may still profitably deviate on a mass of students. In Appendix A.3,
we show that no such global deviation is profitable. That is, a strategy profile satisfying local
incentives is indeed an equilibrium.
Inspection of colleges’ marginal payoffs together with Lemma 2 reveals their admission decisions
in more detail. Note that Hi can be rewritten as
Hi(v, σj(v)) = (1− σj(v)) (v − vi) + σj(v)E[µi(s)] (v − vi),
where
vi := λProb(s ∈ Si) and vi := λProb(s ∈ Si)
E[µi(s)|s ∈ Si]
E[µi(s)]
are college i’s capacity costs of admitting a student when she does not receive an admission offer
from college j and when she does, respectively. Recall that the college incurs capacity cost only
when there is over-enrollment. If the student does not receive a competing offer from college j, then
she accepts i’s admission for sure. Hence, over-enrollment occurs with probability Prob(s ∈ Si),
entailing the marginal cost vi. If the student receives a competing offer from college j, then she
accepts i’s offer only when she prefers i to j. Hence, conditional on acceptance, the over-enrollment
arises with probability Prob(s ∈ Si) E[µi(s)|s∈Si]E[µi(s)] , entailing the marginal cost vi.
Note that we have vi > vi. This is because while acceptance by students without offer from
college j is independent of the state, the acceptance by students with offer from college j is more
concentrated in the high demand state for college i, making the latter more costly. This explains
why a college finds it optimal to favor the students without a competing offer than those with a
competing offer. 11
Lemma 3. In any competitive equilibrium, Hi(v, x), i = A,B, is strictly increasing in v for
each x. Moreover, for each v, Hi(v, x) satisfies the single crossing property: If Hi(v, x) ≤ 0, then
Hi(v, x
′) < 0 for any x′ > x.
Proof. See Appendix A.4. 
11Legacy admissions can be seen as a way for colleges to avoid uncertainty. Legacies (those who are children or
close relatives of alumni) for a college are likely to have loyalty for that college; that is, their preferences (and hence
their acceptance decisions) are not much various across states comparing to the other students. Thus, colleges will
have incentive to favor those students. See Section 8 for more discussion.
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Lemma 3 implies that Hi(v, β(v)) partitions the students’ type space into three intervals, as
depicted in Figure 3.1. Notice first that Hi(vi, 1) = 0 and Hi(vi, 0) = 0. Since Hi(v, 1) > 0 for
v > vi and Hi(v, 0) < 0 for v < vi (recall Hi is strictly increasing in v), college i admits all students
with v > vi even if college j admits all of them and rejects all students with v < vi even if college
j rejects all of those students.
For the students with v ∈ (vi, vi), we have Hi(v, 1) < 0 < Hi(v, 0). This means that college i’s
incentive for admitting these students depends on college j’s admission decisions toward them. The
single crossing property established in Lemma 3 implies that for each v, there exists σ̂j(v) ∈ (0, 1)
such that Hi(v, x) > 0 if x < σ̂j(v), Hi(v, x) < 0 if x > σ̂j(v), and Hi(v, σ̂j(v)) = 0 if x = σ̂j(v).
Hence, college i admits (rejects) all students with v if college j admits less (greater) than fraction
σ̂j(v) of them and admits any fraction of those students if college j admits exactly fraction σ̂j(v) ∈
(0, 1) of them. In particular, college i admits all of them if college j does not admit any of them,
but does not admit them if college j admits all of them.
Combining the two colleges’ admission decisions leads to the following characterization of equi-
libria.
Theorem 1. In any competitive equilibrium, there exist vi < vi, i = A,B, such that college i admits
students with v > vi and v ∈ [vi, vj ] and rejects students with v < vi and v ∈ [vj , vi], where j 6= i.
At least one college admits a positive fraction of students with v ∈ [max {vA, vB} ,min {vA, vB}].
Theorem 1 describes the structure of competitive equilibrium. Figure 3.2 depicts a typical
pure-strategy equilibrium. Here, the students at the top with v > vA = max {vA, vB} receive
admissions from both colleges, because their scores are above the high cutoffs of both colleges. And
the students at the bottom below vB = min {vA, vB} do not receive any admissions. Strategic
targeting occurs with students in the middle with v ∈ [vB, vA]. The students with v ∈ [vB, vA]
are admitted only by B, since A finds them admission-worthy only if B does not admit them, but
B admits them no matter what A does. Each of the students in the intermediate range of scores,
i.e., [vA, vB], receives an admission from only one college. The students with scores v ∈ [vB, vA]
receive admissions only from B, since that college alone finds them admission-worthy given that
they are not admitted by A. This pattern of strategic targeting — i.e., forgoing good students
sought after by the other college but admitting less attractive ones neglected by others — stands
in stark contrast with the cutoff strategy equilibrium found by the existing literature (see Chade,
Lewis and Smith, 2011).
The particular pattern of strategic targeting, namely how the two colleges coordinate exactly
on the students in [vA, vB], is indeterminate, and the figure depicts one possible coordination.
12
12 As noted, there may be many ways for colleges to coordinate their admissions for students with v ∈ [v̌, v̂], where
v̌ := max {vA, vB} and v̂ := min {vA, vB}. The range of different pure-strategy equilibria can be summarized by
two extreme types of equilibria. We call a competitive equilibrium an A-priority equilibrium if σA(v) = 1 for all
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1
σB(v)
0 vB vA vB vA 1 v
Figure 3.2: Pure-Strategy Equilibrium
In practice, it is implausible for colleges to achieve the kind of precise coordination described in
the pure-strategy equilibria. It seems much more plausible for colleges to randomize its admission
over students with the intermediate range of scores v ∈ [v̌, v̂], where v̌ := max {vA, vB} and v̂ :=
min {vA, vB}.13 A typical mixed-strategy equilibrium is depicted in Figure 3.3.
Notice that the admission strategies outside the intermediate range is similar to that in the
above pure-strategy equilibrium, as completely pinned down by Theorem 1. For the intermediate





i (v)) = 0 for j 6= i. Given this behavior, college j is indifferent and therefore finds it a best
response to admit a fraction σoj (v) of students with v, where s
o
j(v) satisfies Hi(v, σ
o
j (v)) = 0.
The fractions of admitted students are thus pinned down in equilibrium, but the identities
of the chosen students are not; each college randomizes on the students it admits. In practice,
colleges could use extraneous or nonessential students’ attributes as their randomization device.
Examples may include extracurricular activities or non-academic performances. Although in many
cases colleges’s interests in these aspects are genuine, our theory is consistent with colleges placing
excessive weights on them in their admission decisions, as will be discussed at length in the next
section.
Observe that each college admits a higher fraction of students with higher scores, since σoi (·)
coordination is tilted in favor of college i. Clearly, between these two equilibria, one can construct (infinitely) many
equilibria.
13It is important to note that the thresholds are not necessarily the same as in the pure-strategies, since different
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Figure 3.3: Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium
is increasing in v. This is intuitive: Higher score students are more valuable all else equal, so
admitting a higher fraction of those students is necessary to keep the opponent college indifferent.
It is also interesting to observe discrete jumps in this figure — σoA(vA) > 0 and σ
o
B(vB) < 1. The
former follows from the fact that vA > vB which implies HB(vA, 0) > 0, and the latter follows from
vA > vB which implies HA(vB, 1) < 0.
There could be many ways for colleges to play mixed-strategies: For instance, colleges could
coordinate to use a pure-strategy for some students, say [ṽ, v̂] for some ṽ ∈ (v̌, v̂), and use mixed-
strategies for v ∈ [v̌, ṽ]. Consistent with our selection, we focus on the maximally mixed equi-
librium (MME, in short) in which both colleges play mixed-strategies (σoA, σ
o
B) for students with
v ∈ [v̌, v̂] and according to Theorem 1 for outside that range.
Theorem 2. There exists a competitive equilibrium with maximal mixing.
Proof. See Appendix A.6. 
We sketch the proof here.14 The proof constructs equilibrium strategies (σA, σB) with maximal
mixing in terms of threshold states (ŝA, ŝB). Since the latter space is Euclidean (whereas the former
is functional), we can simply appeal to the Brouwer’s fixed point theorem to establish the existence.
To begin, fix any candidate threshold states ŝ = (ŝA, ŝB) for the two colleges. Next, we construct
14The same argument proves the A- or B-priority equilibrium. Note that existence of an (arbitrary) equilibrium
follows from the Glicksberg-Fan theorem, since each college’s strategy space is compact and convex, and each college’s
payoff function is concave in its own strategy. A proof is required here only because the special structure of behavior
we impose on MME (or A- or B-priority) we insist upon.
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the colleges’ mutual best-responses (σA, σB) corresponding to the chosen ŝ following the algorithm
described earlier. Formally, we set for i, j = A,B and i 6= j,
σi(v; ŝ) =

1 if Hi(v, 1; ŝ) > 0
0 if Hi(v, 1; ŝ) < 0, Hj(v, 1; ŝ) > 0
σoi (v; ŝ) if Hi(v, 1; ŝ) < 0 < Hi(v, 0; ŝ), Hj(v, 1; ŝ) < 0 < Hj(v, 0; ŝ)
1 if Hi(v, 0; ŝ) > 0, Hj(v, 0; ŝ) < 0
0 if Hi(v, 0; ŝ) < 0
(3.1)
where σoi (·) satisfies Hj(v, σoi (v); ŝ) = 0 for v ∈ [v̌, v̂].
Since the threshold states (ŝA, ŝB) are arbitrary, there is no guarantee that the constructed
strategies reproduce them as the correct thresholds. In fact, they will reproduce another possible
threshold states s̃ = (s̃A, s̃B):
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s̃A = inf{s ∈ [0, 1] |mA(s; ŝ)− κ > 0} and s̃B = inf{s ∈ [0, 1] |mB(s; ŝ)− κ > 0}, (3.2)
where mA and mB are derived from the formula (2.1).
But this process defines a mapping T : [0, 1]2 → [0, 1]2 such that T (ŝ) = s̃. In Appendix A.6,
we apply the Brouwer’s fixed point theorem to show that T admits a fixed point ŝ∗ = (ŝ∗A, ŝ
∗
B) such
that T (ŝ∗) = ŝ∗. By Lemma 2, the strategies (σA, σB) constructed as above based on this fixed
point ŝ∗ = (ŝ∗A, ŝ
∗
B) does form mutual best responses for the colleges, given the accurate thresholds.
It is important to recognize that a randomization by each college arises from its attempt to avoid
competition for students in the intermediate range of scores. In this sense, as long as a competitive
equilibrium admits the intermediate region, i.e., if v̌ = max{vA, vB} < v̂ = min{vA, vB}, one can
say that equilibrium involves strategic targeting, regardless of whether the colleges play a mixed-
or a pure-strategy. We say competitive equilibrium exhibits strategic targeting if v̌ < v̂.
When do competitive equilibria exhibit strategic targeting? Note that MME does not preclude
a competitive equilibrium in which v̂ < v̌. Figure 3.4 depicts such a possibility with vB < vB <
vA < vA. As before, college i admits students with v > vi and rejects those with v < vi. Observe
that college A does not admit any student with v ∈ [vA, vA], since college B admits them for sure
(because vB < vA). Even though colleges have targeting incentives in this example, the resulting
equilibrium is indistinguishable from the cutoff equilibria featured in the existing research.
A natural question is when such an equilibrium can be ruled out. The exact condition for its
existence appears difficult to find, but we show next that the symmetric environment is sufficient
to guarantee strategic targeting behavior.
15As usual, these formulae are valid only if the associated sets in (3.2) are nonempty. If they are empty, then
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Figure 3.4: Cutoff Equilibrium
Theorem 3. If the environment is symmetric (i.e., µ(s) = 1 − µ(1 − s) for all s), then every
competitive equilibrium exhibits strategic targeting.
Proof. See Appendix A.5. 
Note that the result of Theorem 3 does not just apply to symmetric equilibria. Strategic
targeting occurs in any MME so long as the environment is symmetric. The intuition can be
seen more clearly, though, in a symmetric equilibrium. Suppose to the contrary that a symmetric
equilibrium were to involve a (common) cutoff v̂ = v̌. Then, a college faces competition with types
[v̂, v̂ + ε) but would avoid the competition by admitting instead types [v̂ − ε′, v̂) for small enough
ε and ε′, which are chosen to keep the expected yield to remain unchanged. The resulting drop
in the quality of admission pool is negligible but the benefit in reducing the uncertainty is of first
order importance. Hence, the (symmetric) cutoff equilibrium cannot be sustained.
3.1 Properties of Equilibria
We have seen that the equilibrium outcome involves strategic targeting. We now consider the
properties of the equilibria in welfare and fairness.
A few definitions are necessary. For each state s, an assignment is a mapping from V ×{A,B}
into [0, 1] that specifies the fraction of students of given type that is assigned to each college. An
outcome is a mapping from a state to an assignment, i.e., the realized allocation in state s.
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We say that a student has a justified envy at state s if at that state she prefers a college to
the one that enrolls her, even though the former enrolls a student with a lower score. An outcome
is said to be fair if for almost every state, the assignment it selects has no justified envy for almost
all students. Next, an outcome is Pareto efficient if for almost every state, the assignment it
selects is not Pareto dominated, i.e., there is no other assignment in which both colleges and all
students are weakly better off and either at least one college or a positive measure of students is
strictly better off relative to the initial assignment.
It is also useful to study the welfare of one side, taking the other side simply as resources. We
say that an outcome is student efficient if for almost every state, there is no other assignment
in which all students are weakly better off and a positive measure of students is strictly better off
relative to the assignment that the outcome selects. An outcome is said to be college efficient if
for almost every state, no other assignment can make both colleges weakly better off and at lease
one college strictly better off relative to the assignment that the outcome selects. Notice that even
if an outcome is Pareto efficient, this need not imply student efficiency or college efficiency.
The next theorem states properties of equilibria that arise in decentralized matching.
Theorem 4. (i) Every competitive equilibrium is student, college and Pareto inefficient.
(ii) Every competitive equilibrium is unfair if and only if it exhibits strategic targeting.
(iii) Every non-competitive equilibrium is unfair, student inefficient, but college efficient.
(iv) Every non-competitive equilibrium is Pareto inefficient unless almost every student admitted
by one college has higher score than those admitted by the other college.
Proof. See Appendix A.7 
4 Multidimensional Performance Measures and Evaluation Dis-
tortion
In the baseline model, we have assumed that colleges assess students based on a common per-
formance measure. In practice, colleges consider multiple dimensions of students’ attributes and
performances, academic as well as non-academic. Some dimensions are common among colleges;
for instance, SAT scores or grade points average of students are commonly observed and inter-
preted virtually the same by colleges. Others are not so common; for instance, many colleges
require college-specific essays and testing.16 Non-academic measures are likely to be less correlated
among colleges since they are likely to focus on different aspects and interpret them differently.
For instance, students’ community service or leadership activities weigh heavily for some colleges,
16In the US, colleges require essays on topics that are often very differentiated. In Japan, there is a nation-wide
exam, called National Center Test (NCT), and each university has its own exam. Public universities usually use both
NCT and their own exams, and private ones use their own exams only. Similarly, students in Korea take a nationwide
exam and each college often has its own essay tests and/or oral interviews.
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whereas extracurricular activities such as musical or athletic talents may be important for others.
We show that strategic targeting takes a particular form in this environment: Colleges bias their
admissions criteria toward non-common performances.
To illustrate this point, we extend our model as follows. A student’s type is described as a
triple (v, eA, eB) ∈ V × EA × EB ≡ [0, 1]3, where v is the common measure or score for both
colleges, and eA and eB are college specific measures considered respectively by colleges A and B.
One interpretation is that v is a student’s test score of the nationwide exam, and eA and eB are
her performances on college-specific essays or tests. Alternatively, v is an academic performance
measure observed commonly to both colleges, and eA and eB correspond to different dimensions of
extracurricular activities that the two colleges focus on.
As before, v is distributed according to G(·), and ei, i = A,B, is conditionally independent
on v and is distributed according to Xi(·|v) which admits a density xi(·|v). We also assume that
∂
∂vXi(ei|v) < 0 for any ei ∈ [0, 1]. That is, a student with high v has a higher probability of
scoring high ei. We also assume full support of G and Xi for all i. College i only values (v, ei).
Specifically, it derives payoff Ui(v, ei) from matriculating student with type (v, eA, eB), where Ui is
strictly increasing and differentiable in both arguments.
College i’s strategy is now described as a mapping σi : V ×Ei → [0, 1] with interpretation that
it admits a fraction σi of students with type (v, ei). Enrollment uncertainty facing college i with
regard to students with type (v, ei) depends on whether those students receive an admission offer
from college j, j 6= i. Since ej is conditionally uncorrelated with ei, the probability of such event
is σj(v) := E[σj(v, ej)|v].
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Figure 4.1: College’s Cutoff Locus
As before, this marginal payoff consists of a student’s value Ui(v, ei) to college i multiplied by
the probability of the student accepting i’s admission minus the capacity cost the student adds
to i. It is worth noting that the capacity cost depends on the common measure v but not on the
non-common measure ei. This is because a student with high v is more likely to have a competing
offer, so her acceptance decision is likely to be correlated with the (aggregate uncertainty) state,
but conditional on v, ei is independent with ej . Intuitively, a student scoring high in ei is less likely
to be subject to enrollment uncertainty than a student scoring high in v.
We focus on a cutoff strategy equilibrium in which college i admits student type (v, ei) if and
only if ei ≥ ηi(v) for some ηi nonincreasing in v. Figure 4.1 depicts a typical cutoff strategy. In
the figure, the solid line represents the locus of ηi, so the shaded area depicts the types of students
college i admits under a cutoff strategy, where as the dotted line is i’s true indifference curve.
Appendix A.8 provides a condition under which cutoff equilibrium exists. Such an equilibrium
is quite plausible since the use of non-common performance measure by the colleges lessens their
head-on competition and associated enrollment uncertainty.
We shall now show that the colleges further reduce head-on competition and enrollment uncer-
tainty by placing more weight on the non-common measures relative to their common preferences.
The reasoning of Lemma 2 implies that a college i must accept student type (v, ei) if and only if
Hi(v, ei, σj(v)) ≥ 0. In particular, the cutoff locus ei = ηi(v) must satisfy Hi(v, ηi(v), σj(v)) = 0
whenever ηi(v) ∈ (0, 1). Its slope −η′i(v) shows the “relative worth” of the student’s common
performance v in college i’s evaluation, as measured by the units of the student’s non-common
performance that it is willing to give up to obtain a unit increase in her common performance. The
higher this value is, the larger weight the college places on the common performance. In particular,
we shall say that the college under-weights a student’s common performance v and over-weights
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her non-common performance ei if for all v,
−η′(v) ≤ ∂Ui(v, ηi(v))/∂v
∂Ui(v, ηi(v))/∂ei
and the inequality is strict for a positive measure of v.17 Since students with high v contributes
more to enrollment uncertainty than students with high ei, as seen from (4.1), evaluation distortion
arises in a cutoff equilibrium:
Theorem 5. In a cutoff equilibrium, each college under-weights a student’s common performance
and over-weights her non-common performance.
Proof. See Appendix A.8. 
This particular form of strategic targeting again entails justified envy in a positive measure of
states. Among students who prefer A to B, those who are in region II (at the bottom between
dotted and solid lines) in Figure 4.1 have justified envy toward those students in region I (at the
top between solid and dotted lines). Pareto inefficiency also arises, since a college also underfills
its seats in a positive measure of states, which could have been filled (Pareto improvingly) with
unmatched students.
Theorem 6. A cutoff equilibrium is unfair and students, college and Pareto inefficient.
5 Restriction on Applications: Self-Targeting
So far, we have studied decentralized college admissions in the most stylized format. In the current
and the following sections, we study two common ways for colleges to manage their enrollment
uncertainty. We assume, as with the baseline model, that students’ type is single dimensional.
One common method used in many countries is to limit the number of applications that students
can submit. For instance, students cannot apply to both Cambridge and Oxford in the UK, and
applicants in Japan can only apply to one public university.18 In Korea, all schools (more precisely,
college-department pairs) are partitioned into three groups, and students are allowed to apply to
only one in each group.19
17Suppose for instance Ui(v, ei) = (1− ρ) v + ρ ei. Then, the condition means −η′(v) ≤ 1−ρρ , so the college places
a weight less than 1− ρ to common performance v and the weight more than ρ to non-common performance ei.
18Public colleges in Japan may hold three exams. The first one is called “zenki(former period)-exam” and the last
one is called “koki(later period)-exam”. There are very small number of schools that have exam between these two
exams. Students can apply to at most one public school at each exam date but the deadline for registering to the
school that a student is admitted at zenki-exam is earlier than the date for applying the koki-exam.
19Although there is no such restriction in the US, high application fees may serve this role. See Chade and Smith
(2006) and Chade, Lewis and Smith (2011) for students application decisions subject to application costs, without
aggregate uncertainty.
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Limiting the number of applications a student can make forces her to “self-target” colleges.
Since students are likely to apply to schools they are most likely to accept when admitted, this
method improves the odds of enrollment for colleges and reduces their yield management burden.
In our model with two colleges, if the number of applications is restricted to one, colleges face
no enrollment uncertainty because a student admitted by a college will never turn down its offer,
so their admission behavior is non-strategic; namely, they admit students in the order of v until
their capacities are filled. As will be seen, however, students’ application behavior will be strategic.
Thus, the overall welfare effects are not clear a priori.
We now provide a simple model showing students’ application behavior when students can apply
to only one college. To this end, we introduce students’ cardinal preferences for colleges.20 Each
student has a taste y ∈ Y ≡ [0, 1], which is independent of score v ∈ [0, 1]. A student with taste
y obtains payoff y from attending college A and 1 − y from attending college B. Thus, students
with y ∈ [0, 12 ] prefer B to A, and those with y ∈ [
1
2 , 1] prefer A to B. To facilitate the analysis,
we assume that colleges observe an applicant’s score v but not her preference y, while each student
knows her preference y but not her score v.21 In reality, even though students submit their records
to colleges, they do not know precisely how they are ranked by colleges. See Avery and Levin
(2010) for the same treatment.
A student’s taste y is drawn according to a distribution that depends on the underlying state.
For a given s, let K(y|s) be the distribution of y with a density function k(y|s), which is continuous







meaning that a student’s taste is more likely to be high in a high state. We further assume that
there is δ > 0 such that
∣∣∣ky(y|s)k(y|s) ∣∣∣ < δ for any y ∈ [0, 1] and s ∈ [0, 1], which means that students’
tastes change moderately according to the state. Each student with taste y forms a posterior belief
about the state s, given by the following conditional density:
l(s|y) := k(y|s)∫ 1
0 k(y|s)ds
.
Before proceeding, we make the following observations: First, for each student, applying to a
school dominates not applying at all. Second, since a student does not know her score and her
preference is independent of the score, her application depends only on the preference. Third, since
each student’s preference depends on the state, the mass of students applying to each college varies
across states. Let ni(s) be the mass of students who apply to college i = A,B in state s.
20Note that this does not alter the previous analyses, because even if students have cardinal preferences, it is still
a weak dominant strategy for students to apply to both colleges in the previous model.
21Note that our analysis in Section 3 remains valid with this assumption.
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We next consider a college’s admission strategy. Since a college faces no enrollment uncertainty,
it is optimal to admit all students up to a cutoff
ci(s) := inf {c ∈ [0, 1] |ni(s)[1−G(c)] ≤ κ} .
If ni(s) ≥ κ in state s, then college i will set its cutoff so as to admit students up to its capacity.
Otherwise, it will admit all applicants.
Consider now students’ application decisions. Fix any σ : Y → [0, 1] which maps from taste to





Clearly, nB(s) = 1 − nA(s). A student with taste y expects to be admitted by college i with
probability








for i = A,B. This probability depends on the student’s
preference intensity y since it is informative about the underlying states. Note that a student with
taste y will apply to A if and only if
yPA(y|σ) ≥ (1− y)PB(y|σ).
We show that students follow a cutoff strategy in any equilibrium, given a moderate value of δ.
Lemma 4. Suppose δ ≤ 12 . In any equilibrium, there exists a cutoff ŷ such that students with y ≥ ŷ
apply to A and those with y < ŷ apply to B. And such an equilibrium exists.
Proof. See Appendix A.9. 
We now show that an equilibrium involves strategic application by students if one school is
more popular than the other.








, where ŷ is
the equilibrium cutoff.
Proof. See Appendix A.9. 
The intuition behind Theorem 7 is clear. Suppose college A is popular so that a student expects
to be admitted more easily by college B than college A, when all others employ a cutoff at 12 . Then,
a student who prefers B (y ≤ 12) must apply to B. But, for a student who mildly prefers A (i.e., y




















Figure 5.1: Equilibrium Assignment when κ = 0.4
there is a higher chance of admission at B. Thus, she may apply to B instead of A, leading to a
cutoff ŷ > 12 as depicted in Figure 5.1.
Example 1. Suppose there are two states a and b, each arising with probability 12 . Let K(y|a) = y
2,
K(y|b) = y and κ = 0.4. Then, we have
ŷ nA(a) nB(a) cA(a) cB(a) nA(b) nB(b) cA(b) cB(b)
0.547 0.701 0.299 0.429 0 0.453 0.547 0.116 0.269
Observe that if ni(s) ≥ κ for all s and all i = A,B, then the self-targeting eliminates colleges’
yield management problem, since each college fills its capacity with the best students among those
who applied to it. But, a college may be undersubscribed; for instance, the mass of applicants to
college B in state a is smaller than its capacity (nB(a) = 0.299 < κ = 0.4).
Let us now consider welfare and fairness properties of the equilibrium outcome. First, the
equilibrium is unfair. That is, justified envy arises in that (i) students who happen to have applied
to a more popular college for a given state may be unassigned even though their scores would
have been good enough for the other college to accept (the area on the bottom right below the
light-shaded area of Figure 5.1(a)); and (ii) students who prefer ex ante more popular college may
apply to and get into an ex ante less popular college, although they could have gotten into the
former when it is ex post less popular (the dark-shaded area between 12 and ŷ of Figure 5.1(b)).
Second, a college may be undersubscribed in equilibrium so that its capacity is not filled even
though there are unassigned, acceptable students. By assigning those students to unfilled seats
of that college, students and college will be all better off. Thus, the equilibrium outcome is still
student, college and Pareto inefficient.
Theorem 8. The outcome of the restricted applications is unfair. Suppose K(ŷ|s) < κ for a
positive measure of states. Then, college B suffers from under-subscription, and the outcome is
student, college and Pareto inefficient.
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Proof. See Appendix A.9. 
6 Sequential Admissions: Wait-listing
Colleges also manage enrollment uncertainty by offering admissions sequentially. According to
this method, a college would admit initially some applicants and wait-list others and later admit
students from the latter group when some of the former group decline admissions, and this process
may repeat. Wait-listing is adopted by most colleges in France, Korea, and the US.22 In a typical
application, the acceptance decisions are not deferred and/or the number of iterations is limited.
Hence, even though wait-listing allows for more admission offers and acceptances than the baseline
model or restricted applications, it does not fully eliminate congestion. For this reason, strategic
targeting remains an issue as well.
To see this, we consider a simple extension of our baseline model. There are three colleges, A,
B and C, each with a mass κ < 13 capacity. There is a unit mass of students with score v, where
v is distributed from [0, 1] according to G(·) as before. All students prefer A and B to C, but C
is sufficiently better than not attending any school. Colleges’ preferences are given by students’
scores, but for each student, there is a probability ε that each of colleges A and B finds the student
unacceptable. College C admits students simply based on their scores.
There are two states, a and b, each arising with probability 12 . In state i = a, b, a fraction si
of students gets utility u from A and u′(< u) from B, and the remaining 1− si students have the
opposite preference, where sa = 1− sb > 12 . In either state, a student gets utility u
′′ from C, where
(1 − ε)u < u′′ < u so that entering C with certainty is better than entering A with probability
1− ε. In state a, the mass of students who prefer A to B is larger than that of those who prefer B
to A (sa >
1
2 > 1− sa), and in state b, the opposite is true (sb <
1
2 < 1− sb).
Suppose also the capacity cost is prohibitively high so that whenever a college makes an admis-
sion decision, it must make sure that the capacity constraint is not violated. Wait-listing has the
following feature. In each round, each college admits a set of students and wait-lists the remain-
ing. A student who has received an offer must accept or reject the offer immediately; that is, the
acceptance decision cannot be deferred. After the first round, colleges A and B learn the state, so
the game effectively ends in two rounds.
We show that there is no symmetric equilibrium in which both colleges A and B use a cutoff
strategy (i.e., admit the top κ acceptable students) in the first round.
Theorem 9. There is no symmetric equilibrium in which both A and B offer admissions to the
top κ students (excluding those whom they find unacceptable) in the first round.
Proof. See Appendix A.10. 
22In the US, nearly 45 percent of four-year colleges utilize wait lists in 2011 (Clinedinst, Hurley and Hawkins,
2012).
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The intuition behind this result is as follows. Suppose colleges A and B admit the most preferred
candidates up to their capacities with a plan to approach the next best students in case some of
those first group students turn their offers down. The problem with this strategy is that when some
of those admitted turn down their offers, the second-best students may not be available for the
colleges. The reason is that those latter students are uncertain about whether A or B find them
acceptable, hence if they receive an admission offer from college C, they would simply accept it.
This means that the students who remain after the first round are likely to be far worse than the
second-best group. Hence, a college would deviate profitably by leapfrogging some of the top κ
students and preemptively admitting some of the second-best students.
Theorem 9 implies that strategic targeting must occur in any symmetric equilibrium. The
strategic targeting here can be traced to the uncertainty facing the colleges about what students will
remain after each round. This uncertainty in turn arises from the uncertainty students face about
the offers they will receive in case they turn down current offers. Without a deferral of decisions,
either by colleges in admitting students or by students in accepting offers, the uncertainties result
in strategic targeting.23
Again, strategic targeting—i.e., a non-cutoff nature of equilibrium—means that the equilibrium
outcome involves justified envy and is thus unfair. It is also student inefficient because there are two
groups of students, among those in the second-best group, one preferring A but are admitted only
by B and the other preferring B but are admitted only by A. In sum, the undesirable properties
of decentralized matching are not eliminated by wait-listing.
Such a pattern of strategic targeting is observed in practice. We present one evidence with the
admissions decision employed by Hanyang University in Korea.24 Figure 6.1 depicts the distribution
of the nation-wide College Scholastic Ability Test (CSAT) scores earned by the students who are
admitted by the Department of Economics and Finance (DEF) at different sequential rounds from
2011 to 2013.25 The horizontal axis represents students’ CSAT scores,26 and the vertical axis is the
number of students admitted in each round of wait lists. The figure reveals a pattern of strategic
targeting for each year. In 2011, 133 students applied, and DEF admitted 35 students in the first
round, 7 students in the second round and additional 9 students in the subsequent rounds. The
average score of the top four students admitted in the second round (266.155) is higher than that
23As will be seen in the next section, the deferral of decisions allowed in the Gale-Shapley’s algorithm solves this
problem.
24We gratefully acknowledge the Hanyang University for providing their admissions data.
25As noted in Section 5, each college-department pair (unit) in Korea is divided into three groups, called groups
Ga, Na and Da, and students can apply to one in each group. Thus, an unit in each group competes with other units
in the same group but does not face competition with units in other groups. DEF divided its quota into two groups,
Ga and Na, and admitted students separately for the two groups. We focus on admissions decision on the group Ga,
which is the primary target group of DEF. The quota assigned for group Ga is twice as many as the quota for group
Na.
26The total score of CSAT is normalized as 280 by the admission office, while the actual score may depend on the





Note: “ith,” i = 1, .., 4, means the ith round of wait lists and “>5th” includes all rounds after 5th round.
Figure 6.1: Admissions on Wait Lists
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of the bottom four students in the first round (266.027). In 2012, DEF admitted 54 students in
11 rounds among 103 applicants. It admitted 34 students in the first round and 2 students in the
second rounds. The highest score in the second round (273.844) is the same as the 27th highest
one in the first round. In 2013, 45 students are admitted in 8 rounds among 124 applicants. DEF
admitted 31 and 3 students in the first and the second rounds, respectively. The scores of the top
two students in the second round are higher than those of the bottom three students in the first
round. The reason for the observed non-monotonicity is that the DEF awards a significant number
of its admissions based on a measure that “garbles” a student’s CSAT score by another measure
that is regarded as less informative of the student’s ability.27
7 Centralized Matching via Deferred Acceptance
The most systemic response to enrollment uncertainty would be to have a central clearinghouse
coordinate the preferences on both sides of the market. Such a centralized procedure is adopted in
some countries, such as Australia, China, Germany, Taiwan, Turkey and the UK.28 In this section,
we consider a centralized matching with a Gale and Shapley’s Deferred Acceptance algorithm
(henceforth DA). Not only is the DA employed in many centralized markets, such as public school
admissions and medical residency assignments, but it has a number of desirable properties compared
with the outcomes of decentralized matching, as we shall highlight below.
In the DA algorithm, students and colleges report their ordinal preferences to the clearinghouse,
which then uses the information to simulate the following multi-round procedure. In each round,
students propose to the best schools that have not yet rejected them. The colleges then accept
tentatively the applicants in the order of their scores up to their capacities and rejects the rest.
This process is repeated until no further proposals are made, in which case each student is assigned
to a college that has tentatively accepted her proposal.29
Figure 7.1 illustrates the process for the case µ(s) ≥ 12 . In the first round, a fraction µ(s) of
27A college in Korea typically considers an applicant’s CSAT score and his/her high school grade point average
(GPA). But for the high school GPA, a college is prohibited by law from adjusting it for the quality of the high
school the student is attending. Since the quality of high schools differs significantly across regions and between
“special-purpose” schools and regular schools, a student’s CSAT score is widely regarded as a more reliable indicator
of his/her ability than his/her high school GPA. In keeping with this, DEF, as well as many other departments, at
Hanyang University awards a small number of the so-called “priority” admissions in its first round admission based
solely on applicants’ CSAT scores. But for the remaining admissions in the first and the subsequent rounds, DEF
makes selection based on the sum of an applicant’s CSAT score and his/her GPA (unadjusted for high school quality).
Accordingly, the students receiving priority admissions have higher CSAT scores than all other admitted students.
But, because of the “garbling” of the CSAT scores by the high school GPA for the remaining admissions, the students
admitted in the earlier rounds need not have higher CSAT scores than those admitted in later rounds. Figure 6.1
includes the students receiving priority admissions.
28See Chen and Kesten (2011) for Shanghai mechanism and Westkamp (2013) for Germany medical school match-
ings.
29The outcome of college-proposing DA is the same as that of student-proposing DA in our model, since colleges
have a uniform rank on students. See also Abdulkadiroğlu, Che and Yasuda (2012) and Azevedo and Leshno (2012)


















Figure 7.1: Deferred Acceptance Algorithm
students proposes to college A, and the remaining students propose to college B. Each college
tentatively admits the top κ students among the applicants. Thus, colleges’ cutoffs in this round,
denoted by ĉi(s), i = A,B, satisfy µ(s)[1 − G(ĉA(s))] = κ and (1 − µ(s))[1 − G(ĉB(s))] = κ (see
Figure 7.1(a)). Unassigned students then propose to another college at the second round, and again,
colleges reselect the top κ students from those tentatively admitted and from the new applicants.
Thus, colleges’ cutoffs in this round satisfy µ(s)[1 − G(ĉA(s))] = κ and 1 − G(ĉB(s)) = 2κ (see
Figure 7.1(b)). Since there are no more colleges to which unassigned students can apply, the
assignment is finalized in the second round in our model.
Consider now the equilibrium properties of the DA outcome. Under DA, the matching is strategy
proof for the students, so the students have a dominant strategy of reporting their preferences
truthfully (Dubins and Freedman, 1981; Roth, 1982). In addition, colleges in our model also
report their rankings and capacities truthfully in an ex post equilibrium, namely to form a Nash
equilibrium for any profile of preferences students may report.
Lemma 5. Given the common college preferences, it is an ex post equilibrium for colleges to report
their rankings and capacities truthfully.
Proof. See Appendix A.11. 
The matching in the equilibrium involves no justified envy (Gale and Shapley, 1962; Balinski
and Sönmez, 1999; Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez, 2003) and is student efficient (because colleges’
preferences are acyclic in the sense of Ergin (2002)) and Pareto efficient (an implication of stability).
It also eliminates colleges’ yield management problem completely. Colleges never exceed their
capacities (because it is never allowed by the algorithm) and have no seats left unfilled in the
presence of acceptable unmatched students (a consequence of stability).
In fact, given the homogeneous preferences of the colleges, there exists a single cutoff such that
a student is assigned a college under DA if and only if her score exceeds that cutoff. In order words,
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only those with the top 2κ scores are assigned to a college. This outcome is jointly optimal for the
two colleges, in the sense that it would be selected if the two colleges were to merge. In particular,
the outcome is college efficient.
By contrast, a competitive equilibrium in decentralized matching entails unfilled seats for col-
leges in low-demand states and overfilled seats in high-demand states, so the assignment is far from
jointly optimal. This observation suggests that at least one college must be strictly better off from a
shift from decentralized matching to a centralized matching via the deferred acceptance algorithm.
Despite the overall benefit from switching centralization via DA, it is possible for one college to be
worse off. To see this, consider the following example.
Example 2. Let v ∼ U [0, 1], λ = 5, κ = 0.45 and µ(s) = 25s+
3
5 . Then, in a decentralized admission,
there is a MME such that v̌ = vA < vB = v̂ and colleges’ payoffs in the equilibrium are πA = 0.283
and πB = 0.180. Suppose now that the DA is in use. Then, their payoffs are π
DA
A = 0.321 and




B = 0.495 > πA + πB = 0.463 (overall benefit for the two
colleges), πDAA > πA (college A is strictly better off), but π
DA
B < πB (college B is worse off).
In this example, college A is more popular than B for all states. Yet, in a decentralized
matching, strategic targeting enables college B to attract good students whom it would otherwise
not be able to attract under DA. This may explain why centralized matching is not as common
in college admissions as in other contexts such as public high school admissions. In the latter, the
schools are largely under the control of the school system which serves the interest of the students.
In contrast, colleges are independent strategic players with their own interest to pursue.
Equilibrium properties of the outcome under DA are summarized in the follow.
Theorem 10. Under DA, the equilibrium outcome is fair and student, college and Pareto efficient.
However, some college may be worse off relative to decentralized matching.
8 Conclusion
The current paper has introduced and analyzed a new model of decentralized college admissions. In
the model, colleges make admission decisions subject to aggregate uncertainty about students’ pref-
erences and linear costs for any enrollment exceeding the capacity. We find that colleges’ admission
decisions become a tool for strategic yield management and in equilibrium, colleges seek to manage
their enrollment uncertainty by strategically targeting their admissions to students who are likely
overlooked by their competitors. When colleges also consider students’ performance in college-
specific essays or tests, or their non-academic performance or extracurricular activities, strategic
targeting takes the form of colleges’ overweighting those non-common performance measures and
underweighting common academic measures such as GPA or SAT scores.
We also obtain the welfare and fairness implications of the equilibrium outcomes. We show that
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the equilibrium outcome under decentralized matching entails justified envy and is Pareto inefficient.
Our analytical model also permits a comparison of the outcomes that would arise when students
are forced to self-target by the restricted applications, when admissions are made sequentially,
and when the market is centralized via DA. Both self-targeting and wait-listing alleviate colleges’
yield management burden, but strategic targeting and enrollment uncertainty remain. And so
do inefficiencies and justified envy. Centralized matching via DA completely eliminates the yield
management problem and justified envy, and it also achieves efficiency. At the same time, not
all colleges may benefit from such a centralized matching. This last observation may explain why
college admissions remain decentralized in many countries.
Our analyses have several other implications.
Early Admissions. Early admissions are widely used in the US and Korea. In these countries,
students can apply early often to selected schools, and the schools early-admit them (with binding
or non-binding requirements for students to accept them). The remaining students and seats are
then allocated through regular admissions, operating much as in our baseline model. The early
admissions process thus involves both the elements of sequential admissions, as studied in Section 6,
and of restricted applications, as studied in Section 5. While the process is too complicated to
analyze in our framework (especially with aggregate uncertainty), our analyses suggest an important
purpose the early admissions program may serve. By restricting the number of applications, the
early admissions programs induce students to reveal their preferences for colleges. This, together
with sequential admissions, allows colleges to manage enrollment uncertainty more effectively than
they could without the program. We believe this is an important function of early admissions, in
addition to those recognized by other recent papers (Avery and Levin, 2010; Lee, 2009). Regardless
of the motives, the programs restrict choices for students and force colleges to make decisions based
on less than full information that becomes eventually available to them. As seen in Section 5 and in
Avery and Levin (2010), students are likely to respond strategically, which will likely entail justified
envy and inefficiencies.
Colleges’ Preferences for Loyalty and Enthusiasm. It is well documented that colleges favor
students who are eager to attend them. Students who convey seriousness of their interests through
campus visits, essays, and webcam interviews are known to be marginally favored, especially by
small liberal arts colleges. Early admissions, as Avery and Levin (2010) argue, also serve as a
tool for colleges to identify enthusiastic applicants and favor them in the admission. It is entirely
plausible that these preferences by colleges are intrinsic, as postulated by Avery and Levin (2010).
But, our theory suggests that such a preference by colleges could also arise endogenously from
their desire to manage enrollment uncertainty. Like the students without an competing offer in our
baseline model, those who credibly demonstrate their seriousness of preferences for a college are less
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likely to be subject to aggregate uncertainty, and are thus less likely to contribute to enrollment
uncertainty for a college. This suggests that even a college with no intrinsic preference for the
former students has a reason to favor them. For instance, legacy students (who have a family
history with the school) are likely to have loyalty for schools, making their preferences less subject
to fads and whims that may sway preferences of other students, and hence they contribute less to
enrollment uncertainty. Espenshade, Chung and Walling (2004) show that legacy applicants have
nearly three times the likelihood of being accepted as nonlegacies. Our theory provides a rationale
for why colleges favor those students. Similarly, campus visits, essays and webcam interviews all
serve as a device for screening students’ seriousness of preferences.
Specialized Requirements and College Specific Investments. Colleges often have spe-
cial requirements for their applicants to fulfill. These requirements range from specialized essay
questions, college-specific entrance exams to specialized admissions tracks requiring specific qual-
ifications. For example, colleges in Korea admit a number of students through specialized tracks
that require specific qualifications, such as foreign language skills, awards in contests in science,
music, invention or information technologies. Such requirements help colleges to identify students
with serious interests. More demanding requirements encourage students to make college-specific
investments well in advance of application. Our theory suggests that these investments serve as a
means by which colleges can target and secure enrollment of students even in early stages.
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For Online Publication
A Appendix A: Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Claim 1. Suppose VAB has zero measure. Then, the following results hold.
(i) mA(s) = mB(s) = κ for all s ∈ [0, 1].
(ii) Almost every student with v ≥ G−1(1− 2κ) receives a admission.
Proof. (i) Since VAB is a measure zero set, mi(s) is constant across states for all i = A,B. If
mi(s) < κ, then college i can benefit by admitting some students with measure less than κ−mi(s).
Similarly, if mi(s) > κ, then it can benefit by rejecting some students with measure less than
mi(s)− κ.
(ii) Observe that VA ∪ VB cannot have a gap, otherwise at least one college can benefit by
replacing a positive measure of low score students with the same measure of students in the gap.
So, it must be a connected interval with sup{VA ∪ VB} = 1. Since mA(s) = mB(s) = κ for all s by
Part (i), this means that almost every top 2κ students are admitted. 
Note that the proofs for Parts (i), (ii) and (iv) of the lemma for noncompetitive equilibrium
follow from Claim 1. We thus consider competitive equilibrium in what follows. We prove in the
sequence of Parts (i), (iii) and (ii).
Proof of Part (i). Consider a competitive equilibrium. Suppose mA(1) < κ. Let college A admit
a mass κ −mA(1) of students. Then, the mass of students attending A in this case, denoted by
m̃A(s), satisfies that for any s < 1,
mA(s) < mA(s) + µ(s)[κ−mA(1)] ≤ m̃A(s) ≤ mA(s) + [k −mA(1)] < κ,
where the first and the last inequality follow from the fact that mA(s) < mA(1) for s < 1 (since
µ(·) is strictly increasing in s). Observe that A benefits from such deviation since it admits more
students without having over-enrollment. Hence, we must have κ ≤ mA(1) in equilibrium. Similarly,
if mA(0) > κ, then A can benefit by rejecting a mass mA(0) − κ of students. Therefore, we must
have mA(0) ≤ κ ≤ mA(1) in any competitive equilibrium. The proof for college B is analogous. 
Proof of Part (iii). We consider college A here. The proof for college B will be analogous. Since
µ(·) is strictly increasing and continuous in s, so is mA(·). Thus, there exists ŝA ∈ [0, 1] such that
mA(ŝA) = κ by Part (i). We show that ŝA 6= 0, 1 in what follows.
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σA(v)(1− σB(v) + µ(s)σB(v))dG(v).












σA(v)(1− σB(v) + µ(s)σB(v))dG(v) (A.1.1)
and s̃A is such that m̃A(s̃A) = κ. Note that s̃A > ŝA = 0 since m̃A(s) < mA(s). Now, we can




































































where the second equality follows from (A.1.1) and the last inequality holds for sufficiently small ε.
Next, suppose ŝA = 1. Then, mA(s) < mA(1) = κ for all s < 1. Let A admit all students in
(c, c+ δ) /∈ VA for some c < 1. Then, the mass of students attending A becomes
m̃A(s) = mA(s) +
∫ c+δ
c
(1− σB(v) + µ(s)σB(v))dG(v). (A.1.2)
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Let s̃A be such that m̃A(s̃A) = κ. Note that s̃A < ŝA = 1 since m̃A(s) > mA(s). We can choose δ
such that 1− s̃A < ε for sufficiently small ε. Then, A’s net payoff from the deviation is∫ c+δ
c




















































where the first equality follows from (A.1.2) and the last inequality holds for sufficiently small ε. 
Proof of Part (ii). We first show sup{VA ∪ VB} = 1 and then show that VA ∪ VB is a connected
interval and inf{VA ∪ VB} > 0.
Step 1. sup{VA ∪ VB} = 1.
Proof . Suppose to the contrary that c := sup{VA ∪ VB} < 1. We show that at least one college
can benefit by rejecting some students in favor of those with [c, 1].
Suppose Vi \ VAB contains an open interval with positive measure for some i = A,B. Then, it
is clear that college i can benefit by rejecting a positive measure of students from the bottom of
Vi \ VAB and admits the same measure of students from 1.
Suppose now it is not the case. Let college A reject students in (c, c + δ) ∈ VAB and admit











σA(v)[1− σB(v) + µ(ŝA)σB(v)]dG(v), (A.1.4)
for given ŝA such that mA(ŝA) = κ. The mass of students attending A from this deviation is






σA(v)[1− σB(v) + µ(s)σB(v))dG(v).
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Note that m̃A(ŝA) = mA(ŝA). Denote college A’s payoff from the deviation by π̃A. Then, its net














































where the first inequality holds since σA(v), σB(v), µ = E[µ(s)] ≤ 1 for any v, the first equality
follows from (A.1.3), and the last inequality follows from the fact that µ(·) is strictly increasing in
s, and the last equality follows from (A.1.4). 
Step 2. VA ∪ VB is a connected interval.
Proof . Suppose that there is gap in VA ∪ VB. The proof is analogous to Step 1, where (1− ε, 1] is
now replaced by the gap in VA ∪ VB. We omit the details. 
Step 3. inf{VA ∪ VB} > 0
Proof . Suppose to the contrary that inf{VA ∪ VB} = 0. Suppose inf{VA} = 0. Let A reject a
small fraction of students at the bottom, [0, ε), where 2ε < 1− ŝA and ŝA is such that mA(ŝA) = κ.




σA(v)[1− σB(v) + µ(s)σB(v))dG(v).
Denote s̃A be the state such that m̃A(s̃A) = κ. Note that s̃A > ŝA since m̃A(s) < mA(s). Hence,
we can choose ε such that s̃A − ŝA < ε. Then, A’s net payoff from the deviation is
π̃A − πA = −
∫ ε
0


































































σA(v)[1− σB(v) + µ(s)σB(v)]dG(v)
)
ds
where the last inequality holds since mA(s) > κ for any s ∈ (ŝA, s̃). Thus, we have













σA(v)[1− σB(v) + µ(s)σB(v)]dG(v)
)
ds
> (λ− ε)(1− s̃A)
∫ ε
0














σA(v)[1− σB(v) + µ(s̃A)σB(v)]dG(v)
≥ 0
where the penultimate inequality holds since λ(1− s̃A)− ε = λ((1− ŝA)− (s̃A− ŝA))− ε > λε− ε =
ε(λ− 1) because s̃A − ŝA < ε and 2ε < 1− ŝA.  
A.2 Non-Competitive Equilibrium
In this section, we show that when κ < 12 is not too small or λ > 1 is not too large, there does not
exist a non-competitive equilibrium.
Lemma A1. Suppose that VAB has zero measure. Then, we have the followings:
(i) There is κ̂ < 12 such that for any κ > κ̂, one college has an incentive to deviate.
(ii) There is λ̂ > 1 such that for any λ < λ̂, one college has an incentive to deviate.




v dG(v), i = A,B.
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Now, let ci := inf {Vi} and ci := sup {Vi}.
Proof of (i) . Let cA = inf {VA ∪ VB}, without loss of generality. Then, cA = G−1(1 − 2κ) by
Lemma 1. We show that college A has an incentive to deviate. Suppose A rejects students in
[cA, cA + δ] but accepts those in [cB − ε, cB], where ε and δ are such that
G(cB)−G(cB − ε) = G(cA + δ)−G(cA). (A.2.1)








= µ(s)[G(cB)−G(cB − ε)] + κ− [G(cA + δ)−G(cA)]
≤ κ,
where the second equality holds since mA(s) = κ for all s, and the last inequality follows from
(A.2.1) and the fact that µ(s) ≤ 1 for all s.







v dG(v) = µ
∫ cB
cB−ε




where µ = E[µ(s)]. Therefore,

































µ cB − cA − µ ε− δ
]
, (A.2.2)
where the first equality follows from the integration by parts, and the last equality follows from
(A.2.1). Observe that if µ >
cA
cB
, then (A.2.2) is strictly positive for sufficiently small ε and δ, hence
π̃A > πA. Note that since cA = G
−1(1 − 2κ) and mi(s) = κ for all s and i = A,B, we have that
G(cB) ≥ 1 − κ; that is, cB ≥ G−1(1 − κ). (Otherwise, college A must be admitting more than
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Since the RHS of (A.2.3) is continuous in κ and converges to zero as κ approaches to 12 , there is
κ̂ < 12 such that for any κ > κ̂, µ >
cA
cB
for any given µ. 
Proof of (ii) . Let cB = sup {VA ∪ VB}, without loss of generality. Then, cB = 1 by Lemma 1. We
show that college A has an incentive to deviate. Suppose A rejects students in [cA, cA + δ] but
admits students in [1− ε, 1], where ε and δ satisfy
µ(1− cA)[1−G(1− ε)] = G(cA + δ)−G(cA). (A.2.4)







1 dG(v) = µ(s)[1−G(1− ε)] + κ− [G(cA + δ)−G(cA)].
Let ŝA be such that m̃A(ŝA) = κ, i.e., µ(ŝA)[1 − G(1 − ε)] = [G(cA + δ) − G(cA)]. Since µ(·) is
strictly increasing in s, ŝA = 1− cA by (A.2.4).























µ(s)ds− [G(cA + δ)−G(cA)](1− ŝA)
]
.
and the net payoff from the deviation is












µ(s)ds− [G(cA + δ)−G(cA)](1− ŝA)
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where η = µ(1− cA) and the last equality follows from (A.2.4).
Observe that if µ − η cA − λ
[ ∫ 1
ŝA
µ(s)ds − η(1 − ŝA)
]
> 0, then (A.2.5) is strictly positive for
sufficiently small ε and δ. Note that








µ(s) ds+ (λ− 1) η cA,
Since µ =
∫ 1
0 µ(s) ds >
∫ 1
ŝA
µ(s) ds (which follows from the fact that ŝA < 1), there exists λ̂ > 1
such that for any λ < λ̂, π̃A > πA.  
A.3 Proof of Lemma 2
“If” part. We show that the strategy profile satisfying the stated conditions forms a best response.
First, define σi(v; t) := tσ̃i(v) + (1 − t)σi(v) for t ∈ [0, 1] and for i = A,B. Let ŝi(t) be the
cutoff state in equilibrium for given σi(v; t), and Si(t) be such that SA(t) := {s | s ≥ ŝA(t)} and
SB(t) := {s | s ≤ ŝB(t)}. Next, let
W (t, ŝi(t)) :=
∫ 1
0






σi(v; t)[1− σj(v) + µi(s)σj(v)]dG(v)− κ
]
ds,
where µi = E[µi(s)], and denote it by V (t) := W (t, ŝi(t)). Observe that πi(σ̃i) = V (1) and
πi(σi) = V (0). Therefore, the proof is completed by showing V (1) ≤ V (0). Because σ̃i(·) is
arbitrary, this proves that σi(·) is a best response for a given σj(·), where j 6= i. To do this, we
establish the following lemmas.
Lemma A2. V (·) is concave in t for any t ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. Observe that σi(·; t) is linear in t, clearly. Hence, it suffices to show that πi is concave in σi
because if so, we have for any η ∈ [0, 1] and t, t′ ∈ [0, 1],
V (η t+ (1− η) t′) = πi(σi(v; η t+ (1− η) t′)) = πi(η σi(v; t) + (1− η)σi(v; t′))
≥ η πi(σi(v; t)) + (1− η)πi(σi(v; t′)) = ηV (t) + (1− η)V (t′),



















Consider any feasible σi and σ
′
i. Note that the first part of (A.3.1) is linear in σi clearly, and the
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σi(v)[1− σj(v) + µi(s)σj(v)]dG(v)− κ, 0
}
+ (1− η) max
{∫ 1
0
σ′i(v)[1− σj(v) + µi(s)σj(v)]dG(v)− κ, 0
}
.
Therefore, we have πi(ησi + (1− η)σ′i) ≥ η πi(σi) + (1− η)πA(σ′i). 
Lemma A3. V ′(0) ≤ 0.
Proof. Observe that









v[1− σj(v) + µiσj(v)]− λ
∫
Si(t)




W2(t, ŝi(t)) = λ
[ ∫ 1
0
σi(v; t)[1− σj(v) + µi(ŝi(t))σj(v)] dG(v)− κ
]
.
Notice that W2(0, ŝi(0)) = 0 by definition of ŝi. Therefore, we have
V ′(0) = W1(0, ŝi(0)) =
∫ 1
0
(σ̃i(v)− σi(v))Hi(v, σj(v)) dG(v) ≤ 0,
where the inequality holds since if Hi(v, σj(v)) > 0 for some v, then σi(v) = 1 and σ̃i(v) ≤ 1; if
Hi(v, σj(v)) < 0 for some v, then σi(v) = 0 and σ̃i(v) ≥ 0; and Hi(v, σj(v)) = 0 otherwise. 
Now, note that
πi(σ̃i) = V (1) ≤ V (0) + V ′(0) ≤ V (0) = πi(σi),
where the first inequality follows from the concavity of V (·) and the second inequality follows from
Lemma A3. This completes the proof.
“Only if” part. We now show that in any competitive equilibrium, the strategy profile must
satisfy the stated conditions. Let V+ := {v |Hi(v, σj(v)) > 0} and V− := {v |Hi(v, σj(v)) < 0}.
Suppose to the contrary that in equilibrium, σi(·) doest not satisfy either (i) or (ii) (or both); that
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is, either σi(v) < 1 for v ∈ V+, or σi(v) > 0 for v ∈ V− (or both). Consider a deviating strategy
σ̃i(·) such that σ̃i(v) = 1 for every v ∈ V+, σ̃i(v) = 0 for every v ∈ V−, and σ̃i(v) = σi(v) for all
other v’s. Now, define σi(v; t) := tσ̃i(v) + (1 − t)σi(v) for t ∈ [0, 1] and V (t) similar as above. In
what follows, we show that V ′(0) > 0 so there exists α(·; t) for small t that will be profitable. To
see this, observe that




















where the last equality follows from the construction of σ̃i(·), and the inequality holds since σ̃i(v) =
1 > σi(v), Hi(v, σj(v)) > 0 for v ∈ V+, and σ̃i(v) = 0 < σi(v), Hi(v, σj(v)) < 0 for v ∈ V−.
A.4 Proof of Lemma 3
Observe that Hi(·, x) is strictly increasing in v, since for v′ > v,
Hi(v
′, x)−Hi(v, x) = (1− x+ E[µi(s)]x)(v′ − v) > 0,
where the inequality holds since E[µi(s)] > 0 since µ(·) is strictly increasing in s.
Next, Hi(v, x) satisfies the strict single crossing property with respect to x; that is, if Hi(v, x) ≤
0 for some x ∈ (0, 1), then Hi(v, x′) < 0 for any x′ > x. Suppose for any x ∈ (0, 1),











Consider any x′ > x. If v < λProb(s ∈ Si), then
Hi(v, x
′) = (1− x′)
(









where the inequality follows from (A.4.1) and the facts that x′ > x and E[µi(s)|s ∈ Si] > E[µi(s)].
If v ≥ λProb(s ∈ Si), then






− λProb(s ∈ Si)
(
1− E[µi(s)|s ∈ Si]
)]
> (x′ − x)
(
v − λProb(s ∈ Si)
)(




where the first inequality holds since x′ > x and E[µi(s)|s ∈ Si] > E[µi(s)], and the second
inequality holds since v ≥ λProb(s ∈ Si). Since Hi(v, x) ≤ 0, we thus have Hi(v, x′) < 0.
A.5 Proofs of Theorem 3
Suppose to the contrary that v̂ ≤ v̌ in a competitive equilibrium. Suppose further that
vB < vB ≤ vA < vA, (A.5.1)
without loss of generality, where the first and the last strict inequalities hold since (ŝA, ŝB) ∈ (0, 1)2
by Lemma 1-(iii). Note that we must have vA ∈ (0, 1) in equilibrium, since if vA = 1, then
mA(s) = 0 for all s, and if vA = 0, then vB = vB = vA = vA = 0, so mB(s) = 0 for all s. In
equilibrium, we have
mA(ŝA) = µ(ŝA)[1−G(vA)] = κ, (A.5.2)
and
mB(ŝB) = (1− µ(ŝB))[1−G(vA)] +G(vA)−G(vB) = κ. (A.5.3)
From (A.5.2), 1−G(vA) = κµ(ŝA) . Substituting this into (A.5.3), we have
G(vA)−G(vB) = κ
(




Since vB < vA, this implies
µ(ŝA) + µ(ŝB) > 1⇔ µ(ŝB) > 1− µ(ŝA) = µ(1− ŝA),
where the last equality follows from the symmetry of µ(·). Since µ(·) is strictly increasing, we have
ŝB > 1− ŝA, and so vB = λ ŝB > λ (1− ŝA) = vA which contradicts (A.5.1).
A.6 Proof of Theorem 2
Step 1: Existence of a profile of admission strategies (σA, σB) that forms local best
responses.
We first establish existence of a profile of admission strategies (σA, σB) : [0, 1]
2 → [0, 1]2 such
that for each v ∈ [0, 1], σi(v) is given by (3.1) for i = A,B.30 Now, fix any ŝ = (ŝA, ŝB) ∈ S ≡ [0, 1]2
and consider the resulting profile (σA(·; ŝ), σB(·; ŝ)). This strategy profile in turn induces the mass
30One can also structure the strategy profile to satisfy the requirements of an A-priority equilibrium by replacing
σoA(·) and σoB(·) with 1 and 0, respectively, and of a B-priority equilibrium by replacing them with 0 and 1, respectively.
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σi(v; ŝ)[1− σj(v; ŝ) + µi(s)σj(v; ŝ)] dG(v).
Observe that mi(·; ŝ) and mB(·; ŝ) in turn yield a new profile of cutoff states:
s̃A = inf {s ∈ [0, 1]|mA(s; ŝ)− κ > 0} , (A.6.1)
if the set in the RHS is nonempty, or else s̃A ≡ 1, and
s̃B = sup {s ∈ [0, 1]|mB(s; ŝ)− κ > 0} , (A.6.2)
if the set in the RHS is nonempty, or else s̃B ≡ 0.
Next, define a mapping T such that T (ŝ) = s̃, where s̃ = (s̃A, s̃B) is given by (A.6.1) and
(A.6.2). The next lemma shows that T is continuous. Therefore, it has a fixed point by the
Brouwer’s fixed point theorem. From the construction of T , it is immediate that given the fixed
point, say ŝ∗ = (ŝ∗A, ŝ
∗
B), the profile (σA(·; ŝ∗), σB(·; ŝ∗)) satisfies the local incentives.
Lemma A4. T (·) is continuous in s for s ∈ S.
Proof. Note that vA and vA are continuous in ŝA, and vB and vB are continuous in ŝB. Now, let
v := min {vA, vB} , v̌ := max {vA, vB} , v̂ := min {vA, vB} , v := max {vA, vB} .
For any given ŝ, T (ŝ) = s̃ is given by (A.6.1) and (A.6.2). Consider now any ŝ′ = (ŝ′A, ŝ
′
B) ∈ S,


























Again, s̃′ = (s̃′A, s̃
′



































and consider a partition of [0, 1] such that
V1 = (∪i=2,4,6,8[vi−1, vi]) ∩ [0, 1], V2 = [v4, v5] ∩ [0, 1], V3 = [0, 1] \ (V1 ∪ V2).
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Consider σi and σ
′
i for i = A,B. For any v ∈ [0, 1], we have∫ 1
0




∣∣σ′i(v)− σi(v)∣∣ 1Vk(v) dG(v),
where 1Vk(v) is 1 if v ∈ Vk or 0 otherwise.
Observe, first, that by the continuity of vi and vi, there is a δ1 > 0 such that for any ε > 0, if






Second, for any v ∈ V2, the continuity of σoi (·), given by
σoi (v) :=
v − λProb(s ∈ Sj)
v (1− E[µi(s)])− λProb(s ∈ Sj)
(
1− E[µi(s)|s ∈ Sj ]
) ,
implies that there is δ2 such that ‖ŝ′ − ŝ‖ < δ2 implies
∣∣σ′i(v)− σi(v)∣∣ = ∣∣∣σo′i (v)− σoi (v)∣∣∣ < ε6 , (A.6.4)
Lastly, for any v ∈ V3, α′(v) and α(v) are either 0 or 1 at the same time, hence we have that
∣∣σ′i(v)− σi(v)∣∣ = 0. (A.6.5)
Now, let δ := min {δ1, δ2} and suppose ‖ŝ′ − ŝ‖ < δ. Then, we have∫ 1
0
∣∣σ′i(v)− σi(v)∣∣ dG(v) = ∫ 1
0
∣∣σ′i(v)− σi(v)∣∣ 1V1(v) dG(v) + ∫ 1
0











where the equality follows from (A.6.5) and the inequality follows from (A.6.3) and (A.6.4).




σ′i(v)[1− σ′j(v) + µi(s)σ′j(v)] dG(v)−
∫ 1
0













∣∣σ′i(v)− σi(v)∣∣ dG(v) + (1− µi(s))∫ 1
0
∣∣σ′i(v)σ′j(v)− σi(v)σj(v)∣∣ dG(v) (A.6.7)
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The first part of (A.6.7) is smaller than ε/3 by (A.6.6). The second part of (A.6.7) is∫ 1
0
∣∣σi(v)σ′j(v)− σi(v)σj(v)∣∣ dG(v) =∫ 1
0











where the first inequality holds since σ′i(v), σj(v) ≤ 1, and the last inequality follows from (A.6.6).
Therefore, if ‖ŝ′ − ŝ‖ < δ, then∣∣∣∣∫ 1
0
σ′i(v)[1− σ′j(v) + µi(s)σ′j(v)]dG(v)−
∫ 1
0
σi(v)[1− σj(v) + µi(s)σj(v)]dG(v)
∣∣∣∣ < ε. (A.6.8)
Hence, we conclude that there is δ > 0 such that for any ε > 0, if ‖ŝ′ − ŝ‖ < δ, then ‖s̃′ − s̃‖ < ε.
Since ŝ is chosen arbitrary, T is continuous on S. 
Step 2: VAB has a positive measure in the strategy profile identified in Step 1.
Suppose to the contrary that VAB has measure zero. Then, ŝ∗B = 0 and ŝ∗A = 1. But in that
case, HA(v, 1) > 0 and HB(v, 1) > 0 for all v. Hence, vA = vB = 0. Therefore, we cannot have a
non-competitive equilibrium.
A.7 Proof of Theorem 4
Proof of Part (i). Recall that there are cutoff states (ŝA, ŝB) such that colleges have a mass of
unfilled seats in a positive measure of states, [0, ŝA) for A and (ŝB, 1] for B, despite the fact that
there are unmatched and acceptable students (inf {VA ∪ VB} > 0 in Lemma 1-(ii)). By assigning
those unmatched students to a college with excess capacity, both the students and college are better
off. Thus, it is student, college and Pareto inefficient. 
Proof of Part (ii). Suppose a competitive equilibrium exhibits strategic targeting; i.e., v̌ < v̂.
Fix a state s such that µ(s) 6= 0, 1. For those students in [v̌, v̂], there is a positive measure of
students who are assigned to a college, say B, but prefer A, and their scores are higher than those
of a positive measure of students who are assigned to A, even though both colleges prefer the
high-score students. Moreover, students in [v̌, v̂] get no admission from either college with positive
probabilities even if their scores are high. Thus, it entails justified envy for a positive measure of
states for almost every state.
Suppose now a competitive equilibrium does not exhibit strategic targeting; i.e., v̂ < v̌. Let
vB < vA, as depicted in Figure 3.4, without loss of generality, so students in [vB, vA] admitted
only by B and those in (vA, 1] are admitted by both colleges. Observe that only the students who
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are not admitted by either college or admitted only by college B may have envies. However, the
students whom they envy have higher scores. So, no justified envy arises in any state s, making
the outcome fair. 
Proof of Part (iii). Consider any non-competitive equilibrium. For each state s except µ(s) = 0
or 1, the equilibrium must admit a positive measure of students who prefer A but are assigned
to B and a positive measure of students who are assigned to A but have scores lower than those
of the first group of students; that is, justified envy arises. Since justified envy arises for a positive
measure of students for almost every state,31 the outcome is unfair. Also, for almost every state,
there must be a positive measure of students assigned to A but prefer B and a positive measure of
students assigned to B but prefer A. Thus, the outcome is student inefficient.
Next, the equilibrium is college efficient. To see this, recall that in any non-competitive equi-
librium, almost all top 2κ students are assigned to either college. Suppose to the contrary that for
a given state, there is another assignment that makes both colleges weakly better off and at least
one college strictly better off. Then, it must also admit almost all top 2κ students, or else at least
one college is strictly worse off. Therefore, it is a reallocation of the initial assignment, hence if
one college is strictly better off, then the other college must be strictly worse off. Thus, we reach
a contraction. 
Proof of Part (iv). Suppose that almost all top κ students are assigned to one college, and the
next top κ students are assigned to the other college. Then, any change of assignments by positive
measure of students will leave the former college strictly worse off, hence it is Pareto efficient.
Suppose this is not the case in a non-competitive equilibrium. Note that for a fixed s, there are
some V ′i,V ′′i ⊂ Vi and V ′j ⊂ Vj , i 6= j, all with positive measures, such that v′ < v̂ < v′′ whenever
v′ ∈ V ′i, v′′ ∈ V ′′i and v̂ ∈ V ′j . Let i = A and j = B without loss of generality. We can choose V ′A,


























(If either (A.7.1) or (A.7.2) is violated, we can adjust V ′A, V ′′A and/or V ′B by adding or subtracting
a positive mass of students.) Note that the LHS (resp. RHS) of (A.7.2) is the measure of students
















































where the first equivalence follows from (A.7.2). The last equivalence shows that the average value
of students who prefer college B in V ′A ∪ V ′′A is the same as that of students who prefer college A
in V ′B. Thus, in state s, a fraction 1−µ(s) of students in V ′A∪V ′′A who prefer B to A can be swapped
with a fraction of µ(s) of students in V ′B who prefer A to B. This reassignment leaves both colleges
the same in welfare and makes all students weakly better off and some positive measure of students
strictly better off. Since this argument holds for all s except µ(s) = 0 or 1, the outcome is Pareto
inefficient. 
A.8 Proofs of Theorem 5 and Existence of a Cutoff Equilibrium
A.8.1 Proof of Theorem 5
Suppose there is a cutoff equilibrium with strategy profiles (σA, σB) where σi(v, ei) = 1{ei≥η(v)},
i = A,B, for some ηi(·) which is nonincreasing. Since ∂Ui/∂ei > 0, by the Implicit Function
Theorem, Hi(v, ei, σj(v)) = 0, j 6= i, implicitly defines ηi(v). Since E[µi(s)|s ∈ Si] > E[µi(s)], we
must have
1− σj(v) + E[µi(s)|s ∈ Si]σj(v) > 1− σj(v) + E[µi(s)]σj(v).
Then, Hi(v, ηi(v), σj(v)) = 0 implies that by (4.1),
Ui(v, ηi(v)) > λProb(s ∈ Si). (A.8.1)









Ui(v, ηi(v))(1− E[µi(s)])− λProb(s ∈ Si)(1− E[µi(s)|s ∈ Si])
]
σ′j(v)
1− σj(v) + E[µi(s)]σj(v)
. (A.8.2)






where the inequality holds since η′j(v) ≤ 0 and ∂∂vXj(e|v) < 0.
32 Further, E[µi(s)] < E[µi(s)|s ∈
Si] ≤ 1, so it follows from (A.8.1) that the RHS of (A.8.2) is strictly positive for any v such that





and the inequality is strict for a positive measure of v.
A.8.2 Existence of a Cutoff Equilibrium


























LetM be the set of Lipschitz-continuous function from [0,1] to [0,1] with Lipschitz bound given
by δ. We define an operator T : [0, 1]2 ×M2 → [0, 1]2 ×M2 as follows.
For any (ŝA, ŝB, σA, σB) ∈ [0, 1]2 ×M2, the third component of T (ŝA, ŝB, σA, σB) is a function
α defined as follows. First, ηA(v) is implicitly defined via HA(v, ηA(v), σB(v)) = 0 according to
the Implicit Function Theorem (since ∂UA/∂eA > 0). For v such that ηA(v) ∈ (0, 1), the same



















where the first inequality follows from (A.8.4). It thus follows that α ∈M.
The fourth component of T (ŝA, ŝB, σA, σB), labeled β, is analogously constructed via eB =
32When v and ei are independent, σ
′
j(v) = −xj(ηj(v))η′j(v) ≥ 0. This implies that each college under-weights a
students’ common performance and over-weights her non-common performance at least weakly and one college does
so strictly. Further, together with college j’s condition (total differentiation of Hj), one can show that σ
′
j(v) > 0 for
a positive measure of v, generically.
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ηB(v) determined implicitly by HB(v, ηB(v), σA) = 0, analogously, and belongs to M.
The first two components (ŝ′A, ŝ
′




B) = κ, much as in
the earlier proofs, using σA and σB, along with (ŝA, ŝB) as input.
In sum, the operator T maps from (ŝA, ŝB, σA, σB) ∈ [0, 1]2×M2 to (ŝ′A, ŝ′B, α, β) ∈ [0, 1]2×M2.
By Arzela-Ascoli theorem, the set M endowed with sup norm topology is compact, bounded and
convex. Hence, the same holds for the Cartesian product [0, 1]2×M2. Following the techniques used
in Appendix B, the mapping T is continuous (with respect to sup norm). Hence, by the Schauder’s
theorem, T has a fixed point. The fixed point then identifies a profile of cutoff strategies (σA, σB)
via σA(v, eA) = 1{eA≥ηA(v)} and σB(v, eB) = 1{eB≥ηB(v)}. See Appendix B for technical details.
Step 2: The cutoff strategies identified in Step 1 form an equilibrium under a condition.











for all v, ei, ẽ, s, where
Ψi(s) :=
E[µi(s)|s ∈ Si]− E[µi(s)]
E[µi(s)|s ∈ Si]E[µi(s)]
. (A.8.5)
Since the RHS of each inequality is bounded by some constant, the conditions can be interpreted
as requiring that each college values the non-common performance sufficiently highly. For instance,
if Ui(v, ei) = (1 − ρ)v + ρei for all i = A,B, then the LHS of each inequality will be no less than
ρ − γ, where γ := maxv,eA,eB
{∣∣∣∂XA(eA|v)∂v ∣∣∣ , ∣∣∣∂XB(eB |v)∂v ∣∣∣}, whenever E[µi(s)] ≥ ρ. So the condition
will hold if the RHS of each inequality is less than ρ− γ.
We now show the cutoff strategies identified by Step 1 form an equilibrium, given this condition.
For the proof, it suffices to show that
∂Hi(v, ei, σj(v))
∂v
≥ 0 whenever Hi(v, ei, σj(v)) = 0.









− [Ui(v, ei)(1− E[µi(s)])− λProb(s ∈ Si)(1− E[µi(s)|s ∈ Si])]






1− σj(v) + E[µi(s)]σj(v)
×(
(1− E[µi(s)])−
1− σj(v) + E[µi(s)]σj(v)
1− σj(v) + E[µi(s)|s ∈ Si]σj(v)







E[µi(s)|s ∈ Si]− E[µi(s)]


























where Ψi(s) is given by (A.8.5), the second equality is obtained by substituting Hi(v, ei, σj(v)) = 0,
the first inequality follows since E[µi(s)],E[µi(s)|s ∈ Si] ≤ 1, the penultimate equality follows from
the fact that σj(v) = 1 − Xj(ηj(v)|v), the second inequality follows from (A.8.4), and the last
inequality follows from the above conditions.
We last show that the identified strategies are nonincreasing in v. Note that
dηi(v)
dv
= − ∂Hi(v, ei, σj(v))/∂v
∂Hi(v, ei, σj(v))/∂ei
≤ 0,
where the equality follows from the Implicit Function Theorem, and the inequality holds since







1− σj + E[µi(s)]σj
)
> 0.
A.9 Proofs of Lemma 4 and Theorems 7 and 8
It is convenient to define T (y|σ) := y PA(y|σ)− (1− y)PB(y|s) for the proofs.
A.9.1 Proof of Lemma 4
Fix any σ. To prove the optimality of the cutoff strategy, we show that T ′(y|σ) > 0 for any y. Note
that
T ′(y|σ) = PA(y|σ) + PB(y|σ) + yP ′A(y|σ)− (1− y)P ′B(y|σ)
≥ y
[
















































































Therefore, we have that T ′(y|σ) > 0 since δ ≤ 12 .
It remains to show that there exists an equilibrium in cutoff strategy. Let ŷ be a cutoff. Then,
we have nA(s|ŷ) =
∫ 1



















T (y|ŷ) := yPA(y|ŷ)− (1− y)PB(y|ŷ).
Note that














> 0 and l(s|0) ≥ 0 for all s, and l(s|0) > 0 for a
positive measure of states. Similarly, T (1|ŷ) > 0. By the continuity of T (·|ŷ), there is a ỹ such that




Next, let τ : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] be the map from ŷ to ỹ, which is implicitly defined by T (τ(ŷ)|ŷ) = 0
according to the Implicit Function Theorem (since T ′(y|ŷ)
∣∣
y=ỹ
> 0). Since PA(y|·) is nondecreasing
and PB(y|·) is nonincreasing ŷ, τ(·) is decreasing. Therefore, there is a fixed point such that
τ(ŷ) = ŷ, and hence there is ŷ such that T (ŷ|ŷ) = 0.
A.9.2 Proof of Theorem 7
We first show ŷ < 1. Suppose ŷ = 1. Then, nA(s|1) = 1 −K(1|s) = 0, so PA(y|ŷ) = 1 for any y.
Hence, T (1|1) = PA(1|1) = 1, which contradicts the fact that T (ŷ|ŷ) = 0.
We now show that ŷ > 12 whenever µ(s) >
1
2 . Suppose to the contrary ŷ ≤
1
2 . We then have
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1
2 < µ(s) = 1−K(
1

















l(s|y)ds ≤ 0. (A.9.1)
Hence, if ŷ < 12 , then







where the first inequality holds since ŷ < 12 . Thus, T (ŷ|ŷ) < 0, a contradiction. Suppose now




2 < 1− κ, where the the second
inequality holds since κ < 12 . So, κ/(1 − K(
1
2 |s)) < 1. Therefore, the last inequality of (A.9.1)
becomes strict, and hence



















2 = µ(s) = 1 − K(
1
2 |s) < 1 − K(
1
2 |s), so we have
K(ŷ|s) < 1−K(ŷ|s). By (A.9.1) and (A.9.2), we reach a contradiction. If ŷ > 12 , then
1
2 = µ(s) =
1−K(12 |s) > 1−K(ŷ|s) and so K(ŷ|s) > 1−K(ŷ|s). We then have PA(y|ŷ)− PB(y|ŷ) ≥ 0 and







where the first inequality holds since ŷ > 12 . Thus, T (ŷ|ŷ) > 0, a contradiction again.
A.9.3 Proof of Theorem 8
For the first part of the theorem, observe that for a given s, justified envy arises whenever cA(s) 6=
cB(s) as depicted in Figure 5.1. We thus show that there is a positive measure of states in which
cA(s) 6= cB(s). Suppose to the contrary cA(s) = cB(s) for almost all s. Recall that equilibrium














Since G(·) is strictly increasing, if cA(s) = cB(s), then we must have either ni(s) < κ for all i = A,B
(so that cA(s) = cB(s) = 0) or nA(s) = nB(s) ≥ κ.
First, we cannot have ni(s) < κ for all i in equilibrium, since this means that all applicants are
admitted by either college, and this contradicts to 2κ < 1. Second, suppose nA(s) = nB(s) ≥ κ.
This implies that K(ŷ|s) = 12 for all s (recall that nA(s) = 1 − K(ŷ|s) and nB(s) = K(ŷ|s)).
However, by (5.1), we have K(ŷ|s′) < K(ŷ|s) for all s′ > s. Therefore, we reach a contradiction
again.
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To see the second part of the theorem, recall that for given ŷ in equilibrium, the mass of students
applying to B is K(ŷ|s). Thus, if there is a positive measure of states in which K(ŷ|s) < κ, college
B faces under-subscription in such states. Therefore, the equilibrium outcome is inefficient.
A.10 Proof of Theorem 9
Suppose there is a symmetric equilibrium as described in the theorem. Then, colleges A and B will
admit all acceptable students with v > ṽ, where ṽ is such that each of A and B fills its capacity
in the popular state, i.e., sa(1− ε)[1−G(ṽ)] = κ and (1− sb)(1− ε)[1−G(ṽ)] = κ, and wait-lists
the remaining students. College C will offer admissions to all of these students (i.e., those whose
scores are above ṽ), knowing that exactly measure ε2 of them will accept its offer. It will also offer
κ− ε2 admissions to all students with v ∈ [v̂, ṽ], where v̂ is such that G(ṽ)−G(v̂) = κ− ε2.
The students in [v̂, ṽ] now have a choice to make. If a student accepts C, then she will get u′′
for sure, but if she turns down C’s offer, then with probability 1− ε the less popular one between
A and B will offer an admission to her (assuming all other students admitted by C have accepted
that offer), and the student will earn the payoff u if she happens to like the college, or u′ otherwise.
Since u′′ > (1− ε)u, she will accept C.
Given this, consider now the incentive for deviation of college A. If it does not deviate, there
will be seats left in the less popular state, equal to κ− sb(1− ε)[1−G(v̂)]. Thus, A will fill those































where v̌ is such that
(1− ε)[G(v̂)−G(v̌)] = κ− sb(1− ε)[1−G(ṽ)]. (A.10.1)
and the second equality follows from sa = 1− sb.
Suppose now A admits a small fraction, say δ′, of (acceptable) students just below ṽ instead
of admitting those who are acceptable and slightly above ṽ, say [ṽ, ṽ + δ], where δ and δ′ are such
that
G(ṽ + δ)−G(ṽ) = G(ṽ)−G(ṽ − δ′). (A.10.2)
Notice that students in [ṽ − δ′, ṽ] accept A’s admission offer, since they prefer it over C. Hence,
A’s payoff under the deviation is







































(1− ε)[G(v̂)−G(v)] = κ− (1− ε)[G(ṽ)−G(ṽ − δ′)]− sb(1− ε)[1−G(ṽ + δ)],
that is, v is set to meet the capacity in the less popular state. Observe that v > v̌, since
(1− ε)[G(v̂)−G(v)] = κ− sb(1− ε)[1−G(v̂)]− sa(1− ε)[G(ṽ)−G(ṽ − δ′)]
= (1− ε)[G(v̂)−G(v̌)]− sa(1− ε)[G(ṽ)−G(ṽ − δ′)], (A.10.3)
where the first equality follows from (A.10.2) and the fact that sa = 1 − sb, and the last equality








































































where the second equality follows from the integration by parts, and the third equality follows from
(A.10.2). The inequality holds since
∫ ṽ
ṽ−δ′ G(v) ≤ δ
′G(ṽ),
∫ ṽ+δ
ṽ G(v)dv ≥ δG(ṽ) and
∫ v
v̌ G(v) ≥















Therefore, for sufficiently small δ, we have πdA > πA.
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A.11 Proof of Lemma 5
Recall that when both colleges A and B report truthfully up to the capacity, they achieve jointly
optimal matching for the two colleges. Now suppose college A unilaterally deviates by either
reporting untruthfully about its preferences or its capacity and is strictly better off for some state s.
Then, college B must be strictly worse off. Thus, there must exist a positive measure set of
students whom A must obtain from the deviation which it prefers to some students it had before
the deviation. At the same time, it must be the case that either college B gets a positive measure
set of students who are worse than the former set of students or it has some unfilled seats left after
A’s deviation. Note that students in the former set (who are assigned to A in the new matching)
must prefer B, or else the original matching would be not be stable. But then since B prefer each
of those students to some students it has in the new matching, this means that the new matching
is not stable (given the stated preferences).
B Appendix B: More than Two Colleges
Our main model in Section 2 considers the case with two colleges. In this section, we show that
our analysis extends to the case with more than two colleges. While the extension works for
any arbitrary number of colleges, we provide the result for the three-college case for expositional
simplicity. It will become clear that the method also extends to larger numbers.
Let σi : V → [0, 1] be college i’s admission strategy, where i = 1, 2, 3. In each state s ∈ [0, 1], let
µijk(s), where i, j, k = 1, 2, 3, denote the mass of students whose preference ordering is i  j  k.
Define the following notations.
• µij(s) := µijk(s) + µikj(s) + µkij(s) (the mass of students who prefer i over j in state s),









For given σi(·), i = 1, 2, 3, let ni(v) be the probability that a student with score v attends




(1−σt(v)) +µij(s)σj(v)(1−σk(v)) +µik(s)σk(v)(1−σj(v)) +µij,k(s)σj(v)σk(v).
(B.0.1)
The student will attend college i if she is admitted only by i, which happens with probability
(1−σj(v))(1−σk(v)); or is admitted by college i and one of the less preferred colleges, which happens
with probability µij(s)σj(v)(1−σk(v))+µik(s)σk(v)(1−σj(v)) in state s; or is admitted by both
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of the other colleges but prefers i the most, which happens with probability µij,k(s)σj(v)σk(v) in
state s.
Thus, for a given profile of admission strategies, σ = (σi)i=1,2,3, in equilibrium, the mass of









v σi(v)ni(v) dG(v)− λ
∫ 1
0






Recall that in the two-school case, the monotonicity of µ(·) yields cutoff states (ŝA, ŝB) that
trigger over-enrollment for each college, and the set of over-demanded states for each of them is
a connected interval, (ŝA, 1] and [0, ŝB). Using this, we project the admission strategies to state
space in order to establish the existence of MME. This allows us to use the Brouwer’s fixed point
theorem. When there are more than two colleges, however, we do not know the structure of the set
of over-demanded states in general, so we cannot directly define a map from cutoff states to cutoff
states. Nonetheless, the main idea of the proof can be carried over, although we use a fixed point
theorem (Schauder) in a functional space.
Define a subdistribution Fi : [0, 1]→ [0, 1], i = 1, 2, 3, such that Fi(0) = 0 and
Fi(s) := Prob
(
mi(t) > κ for t < s
)
. (B.0.4)
The subdistribution of college i places a positive mass only on the states in which college i is
over-demanded. Observe that Fi(·) is nondecreasing and
0 ≤ Fi(s′)− Fi(s) ≤ s′ − s, ∀ s′ ≥ s.33
Let Fi be the set of all such subdistributions and F := ×3i=1Fi. (It will become clear that these
33The second inequality holds because
Fi(s
′)− Fi(s) = Prob
(
mi(t) > κ for t < s
′)− Prob(mi(t) > κ for t < s)
= Prob
(
mi(t) > κ for s < t < s
′)
≤ Prob(s < t < s′)










Hi(v, 0, 0) < 0
Hi(v, 0, 1) < 0 < Hi(v, 0, 0)
Hi(v, 1, 0) < 0 < Hi(v, 0, 1)
Hi(v, 1, 1) < 0 < Hi(v, 1, 0)

























⇒ σi = 0 σi = 1
Figure B.1: College i’s Admission Decision
subdistributions will play a similar role to the cutoff states in the two-school case.)























is college i’s marginal payoff from admitting a student with score v. Note that this marginal payoff
depends on the subdistribution Fi, as ni(v) is a constant for given admission strategies (σi)i=1,2,3
(by (B.0.3)) and ni(v) is evaluated by the subdistribution.
Note that (B.0.6) can be decomposed as follow:
Hi(v, σj(v), σj(v)) = (1− σj(v))(1− σk(v))Hi(v, 0, 0) + σj(v)(1− σk(v))Hi(v, 1, 0)
+ (1− σj(v))σk(v)Hi(v, 0, 1) + σj(v)σk(v)Hi(v, 1, 1),
where Hi(v, 0, 0) is college i’s marginal payoff from admitting a student with score v if she is refused
by both of the other colleges, Hi(v, 1, 0) and Hi(v, 0, 1) are the marginal payoffs if the student is
admitted by college j (k) but rejected by k (j, respectively), and Hi(v, 1, 1) is the marginal payoff
if the student is admitted by both of the other colleges.









i , 1, 1) = 0, Hi(v
10
i , 1, 0) = 0, Hi(v
01
i , 0, 1) = 0, Hi(v
00
i , 0, 0) = 0.
Similar to the two-school case, Hi(v, σj , σk) partitions the students’ type space. College i
admits type v students for sure if Hi(v, 1, 1) > 0 and rejects them if Hi(v, 0, 0) < 0. In the
case Hi(v, 1, 1) < 0 < Hi(v, 0, 0), college i admits type v students only when Hi(v, 1, 0) > 0 or
34Note that since Fi is Lipschitz continuous, so it is absolute continuous. Thus, the integration is well defined.
Observe also that (B.0.5) does not involve max {·, ·} in the cost (see (B.0.2) for comparison), as the subdistribution
is defined for states where mi(s) > κ by (B.0.4), and the college’s cost is evaluated by the subdistribution.
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Hi(v, 0, 1) > 0; that is, those students are worthy only in the case that they is admitted by one
of the other colleges. This shows that colleges engage in strategic targeting for those intermediate
range of scores.
Randomization may emerge for some students. For students with v such that
max
i=1,2,3
{Hi(v, 1, 0), Hi(v, 0, 1)} < 0 < min
i=1,2,3
{Hi(v, 0, 0)} ,
all three colleges engage in mixed-strategies, where the mixed-strategies satisfy
Hi(v, σj(v), σk(v)) = 0 ∀i, j, k = 1, 2, 3.
For students with v such that Hk(v, 0, 0) < 0 and
max {Hi(v, 1, 0), Hj(v, 1, 0)} < 0 < min {Hi(v, 0, 0), Hj(v, 0, 0)} ,
college k does not admit such students, but colleges i and j engage in mixed-strategies satisfying
Hi(v, σj , 0) = 0 and Hj(v, σi, 0) = 0.
























Note that, as in the two-school case, there are many ways that colleges could coordinate (even
in a mixed-strategy equilibrium). Hence, we consider the maximally mixed-strategy as before and
provide the existence of such equilibrium.
For a given profile of subdistributions (Fi)
3
i=1, let σ := (σi)
3
i=1 be the profile of admission
strategies that satisfy the local conditions described above. Then, such σ in turn determines a new
profile of subdistributions, (Fi)
3
i=1 via (B.0.4). Next, we define T : F → F , a self-map from the set
of subdistributions to itself, where F = ×3i=1Fi. The existence of equilibrium is achieved when T
has a fixed point (on the functional space of F).
As mentioned earlier, the idea of proving the existence of equilibrium is similar to the idea
of Theorem 2, projecting the strategy profile into a simpler space. The difference is that in the
two-school case, the strategy profiles are projected into the state space, but in the general case,
they are projected into the set of subdistributions F .
Theorem 11. There exists an equilibrium with maximally mixed-strategies.
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(c) College 3 (c3)
Figure B.2: Admission Strategies
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is continuous. Then, T has a fixed point by Schauder’s fixed point theorem.35 We then show that
the identified strategies indeed constitute mutual (global) best responses. We provide a formal
proof in the next subsection.
B.1 Proof of Theorem 11
For given (Fi)i=1,2,3, consider colleges’ strategy profile (σi)i=1,2,3 which satisfies the following local
conditions:
• σi(v) = 1 if H1(v, 1, 1) > 0, i = 1, 2, 3.
• σ1(v) = 0 if H1(v, 1, 1) < 0, H2(v, 1, 1) > 0, H3(v, 1, 1) > 0.
σ2(v) = 0 if H1(v, 1, 1) > 0, H2(v, 1, 1) < 0, H3(v, 1, 1) > 0.
σ3(v) = 0 if H1(v, 1, 1) > 0, H2(v, 1, 1) > 0, H3(v, 1, 1) < 0.
• σ1(v) = 0, σ2(v) = 1, σ3(v) = 1 if

H1(v, 1, 1) < 0
H2(v, 1, 1) < 0, H2(v, 0, 1) > 0
H3(v, 1, 1) < 0, H3(v, 0, 1) > 0
• σ1(v) = 1, σ2(v) = 0, σ3(v) = 1 if

H1(v, 1, 1) < 0, H1(v, 0, 1) > 0
H2(v, 1, 1) < 0
H3(v, 1, 1) < 0, H3(v, 1, 0) > 0
• σ1(v) = 1, σ2(v) = 1, σ3(v) = 0 if

H1(v, 1, 1) < 0, H1(v, 1, 0) > 0
H2(v, 1, 1) < 0, H2(v, 1, 0) > 0
H3(v, 1, 1) < 0
• σ1(v) = 1, σ2(v) = 0, σ3(v) = 0 if

H1(v, 1, 1) < 0, H1(v, 0, 0) > 0
H2(v, 1, 1) < 0, H2(v, 1, 0) < 0
H3(v, 1, 1) < 0, H3(v, 1, 0) < 0
• σ1(v) = 0, σ2(v) = 1, σ3(v) = 0 if

H1(v, 1, 1) < 0, H1(v, 1, 0) < 0
H2(v, 1, 1) < 0, H2(v, 0, 0) > 0
H3(v, 1, 1) < 0, H3(v, 0, 1) < 0
35Schauder’s fixed point theorem is a generalization of Brouwer’s theorem on a normed linear space. It guarantees
that every continuous self-map on a nonempty, compact, convex subset of a normed linear space has a fixed point
(see Ok, 2007).
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• σ1(v) = 0, σ2(v) = 0, σ3(v) = 1 if

H1(v, 1, 1) < 0, H1(v, 0, 1) < 0
H2(v, 1, 1) < 0, H2(v, 0, 1) < 0
H3(v, 1, 1) < 0, H3(v, 0, 0) > 0
• σi(v) = 0 if H1(v, 0, 0) < 0, i = 1, 2, 3.
• σi(v)’s satisfy H1(v, σ2(v), σ3(v)) = H2(v, σ1(v), σ3(v)) = H3(v, σ1(v), σ2(v)) = 0, if
max
i=1,2,3
{Hi(v, 1, 0), Hi(v, 0, 1)} < 0 < min
i=1,2,3
{Hi(v, 0, 0)}
• σi(v) and σj(v) satisfy Hi(v, σj , 0) = 0 and Hj(v, σi, 0) = 0 if Hk(v, 0, 0) < 0 and
max {Hi(v, 1, 0), Hj(v, 1, 0)} < 0 < min {Hi(v, 0, 0), Hj(v, 0, 0)}
Now, let CB([0, 1]) be the space of continuous and bounded real maps on [0, 1]. Then, CB([0, 1])
is a normed linear space, with a sup norm ‖·‖, i.e., for any F, F ′ ∈ CB([0, 1]),
∥∥F − F ′∥∥ = sup
s∈[0,1]
∣∣F (s)− F ′(s)∣∣ .
Lemma 1. F is compact and convex.
Proof. We first show that Fi, i = 1, 2, 3, is closed. To this end, consider any sequence {Fni }, where
Fni ∈ Fi for each n, such that ‖Fni − Fi‖ → 0 as n→∞. We prove that Fi ∈ Fi.
Observe first that Fi is nondecreasing. Suppose to the contrary that Fi(s
′)−Fi(s) < 0 for some
s′ > s. But then,
‖Fni − Fi‖ ≥ max
{∣∣Fni (s′)− Fi(s′)∣∣ , |Fi(s)− Fni (s)|}
≥ 12(
∣∣Fni (s′)− Fi(s′)∣∣+ Fi(s)− Fni (s))
≥ 12




which is a contradiction. Likely, for s′ > s, we must have that Fi(s
′) − Fi(s) ≤ s′ − s. If Fi(s′) −
Fi(s) > s
′ − s, then
‖Fni − Fi‖ ≥ max
{∣∣Fi(s′)− Fni (s′)∣∣ , |Fni (s)− Fi(s)|}
≥ 12(
∣∣Fi(s′)− Fni (s′)∣∣+ |Fni (s)− Fi(s)|)
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≥ 12
∣∣Fi(s′)− Fi(s) + Fni (s)− Fni (s′)∣∣
≥ 12
∣∣Fi(s′)− Fi(s)− (s′ − s)∣∣
> 0,
which is a contradiction again. Combining these, we have Fi ∈ Fi, proving that Fi is closed.
Next, we show that Fi is compact. Note that for any Fi ∈ Fi and s, s′ ∈ [0, 1],
∣∣Fi(s′)− Fi(s)∣∣ ≤ ∣∣s′ − s∣∣ ,
Hence, Fi is Lipschitz continuous and so is equicontinuous and bounded. By the Arzèla-Ascoli
theorem,36 Fi is compact.
We now show that Fi is convex. Observe that for any Fi, F ′i ∈ F and s, s′ ∈ [0, 1], for and
η ∈ (0, 1),
(ηFi + (1− η)F ′i )(s′)− (ηFi + (1− η)F ′i )(s) = η(Fi(s′)− Fi(s)) + (1− η)(F ′i (s′)− F ′i (s))
≤ η(s′ − s) + (1− η)(s′ − s)
= s′ − s,
which proves that Fi is convex.
Since Fi is compact and closed, so is its Cartesian product F = ×3i=1Fi (with respect to the
product topology). 
Lemma 2. T is continuous.
Proof. The proof involves several steps:
Step 1. vjki ’s are continuous on F1, F2, F3.
Proof . We first show that vjki ’s are continuous in Fi. Fix any Fi ∈ Fi and ε > 0. Take δ =
µij,k
2λ ε.
Then, for any Fi, F
′
i ∈ Fi such that ‖Fi − F ′i‖ < δ, we have that∣∣∣vjki − vjk′i ∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣ λµij,k
∫ 1
0





∣∣∣∣µij,k(1)[Fi(1)− F ′i (1)]− ∫ 1
0
µ′ij,k(s)[Fi(s)− F ′i (s)]ds
∣∣∣∣
≤ 2
∥∥Fi(s)− F ′i (s)∥∥
< ε,
36Arzèla-Ascoli theorem gives conditions for a set of C(T ) to be compact, where C(T ) is the space of continuous
maps on T and T is a compact metric space. A subset of C(T ) is compact if and only if it is closed, bounded, and
equicontinuous.
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where the third equality follows from the integration by parts and Fi(0) = F
′





ij,k(s)ds = µij,k(1)− µij,k(0) ≤ 1. 
Step 2. σi’s in mixed-strategies are continuous.
Proof . Consider, at first, students with score v such that
Hk(v, 0, 0) < 0, (B.1.1)
Hi(v, 1, 0) < 0 < Hi(v, 0, 0), (B.1.2)
Hj(v, 1, 0) < 0 < Hj(v, 0, 0). (B.1.3)
That is, college k puts zero probability for those students (by (B.1.1)), and colleges i and j use
mixed-strategies σi and σj which satisfy Hi(v, σj , 0) = 0 and Hj(v, σi, 0) = 0.
Now, let Ji : [0, 1]
2 × [0, 1]2 → [0, 1] such that
Ji(Fi, Fj , σi, σj) ≡ Hi(v, σj , 0) = v
[






(1− σj) + µij(s)σj(v)
]
dFi(s),
Jj(Fi, Fj , σi, σj) ≡ Hj(v, σi, 0) = v
[






(1− σi) + µji(s)σi(v)
]
dFj(s).
Then, σi and σj are the solutions to Ji = 0 and Jj = 0 in terms of Fi and Fj . Observe that




= −Hi(v, 0, 0) +Hi(v, 1, 0) < 0,
where inequality follows from (B.1.2). Similarly, we also have by (B.1.3)
∂Jj
∂σi
















∣∣∣∣∣ = − ∂Ji∂σj ∂Jj∂σi < 0.
Since ∆ji 6= 0, the Implicit function theorem implies that there are unique σi and σj such that
Ji(Fi, Fj , σi, σj) = 0 and Jj(Fi, Fj , σi, σj) = 0.
Furthermore, such σi and σj are continuous.
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Consider now the case that H1(v, σ2, σ3) = H2(v, σ1, σ3) = H3(v, σ1, σ2) = 0 when
max
i=1,2,3
{Hi(v, 1, 0), Hi(v, 0, 1)} < 0 < min
i=1,2,3
{Hi(v, 0, 0)} . (B.1.4)
Similar as before, let
J1(F1, F2, F3, σ1, σ2, σ3) ≡ H1(v, σ2, σ3) = 0,
J2(F1, F2, F3, σ1, σ2, σ3) ≡ H2(v, σ1, σ3) = 0,
J3(F1, F2, F3, σ1, σ2, σ3) ≡ H3(v, σ1, σ2) = 0.
Observe that
Ji = (1− σj)(1− σk)Hi(v, 0, 0) + σj(1− σk)Hi(v, 1, 0) + (1− σj)σkHi(v, 0, 1) + σjσkHi(v, 1, 1)
= (1− σj)Hi(v, 0, 0) + σj(1− σk)Hi(v, 1, 0)− (1− σj)σkHk(v, 1, 0) + σjσkHi(v, 1, 1).




= −Hi(v, 0, 0) + (1− σk)Hi(v, 1, 0) + σkHk(v, 1, 0) + σkHi(v, 1, 1) < 0,
where the inequality holds since Hi(v, 0, 0) > 0, Hi(v, 1, 0) < 0, Hk(v, 1, 0) < 0 and Hi(v, 1, 1) < 0

















































Using the Implicit function theorem again, we conclude that such σ1, σ2, σ3 exist and they are
continuous. 
Observe that from Step 1 and Step 2, Hi(v, σj , σk), i = 1, 2, 3, is continuous in (Fi)i=1,2,3 for a
given s and fixed v.
Step 3. mi(s) is continuous.
Proof . Consider any Fi, F
′
i ∈ Fi such that ‖Fi − F ′i‖ < δ for all i = 1, 2, 3. Let σi and σ′i are
admission strategies of college i which correspond to Fi and F
′
i , respectively. Then, for a given s
and v, ni(v|s) is defined by (B.0.1) and n′i(v|s) is defined similarly using σ′i.
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Let X := {v ∈ [0, 1]| |σi(v)− σ′i(v)| ≥ ε/2}. Clearly,∣∣σi(v)− σ′i(v)∣∣ = ∣∣σi(v)− σ′i(v)∣∣ 1X(v) + ∣∣σi(v)− σ′i(v)∣∣ 1Xc(v),
where 1X(v) is the indicator function which is 1 if v ∈ X or 0 otherwise, andXc is the complementary






For v ∈ Xc, it must be the case that either σi = σ′i, or σi and σ′i are the mixed-strategies. Thus,
we have for v ∈ Xc, ∣∣σi(v)− σ′i(v)∣∣ < ε2 . (B.1.6)
Observe that∫ 1
0
∣∣σi(v)− σ′i(v)∣∣ dG(v) = ∫ 1
0
∣∣σi(v)− σ′i(v)∣∣ 1X(v) dG(v) + ∫ 1
0







∣∣σi(v)− σ′i(v)∣∣ 1Xc(v) dG(v)
< ε,
where the first inequality holds since σi, σ
′
i ≤ 1, and the last inequality follows from (B.1.5) and
(B.1.6). Thus, there exists δ1 such that ‖Fi − F ′i‖ < δ1, for all i, i′ = 1, 2, 3, implies∫ 1
0








Similarly, there are δt, t = 2, 3, 4, such that ‖Fi − F ′i‖ < δt respectively imply that∣∣σiσj(1− σk)− σ′iσ′j(1− σ′k)∣∣ < ε4 , ∣∣σiσk(1− σj)− σ′iσ′k(1− σ′j)∣∣ < ε4 , ∣∣σiσjσk − σ′iσ′jσ′k∣∣ < ε4 .
Now, let δ = mint=1,2,3,4 {δt}. We have that ‖Fi − F ′i‖ < δ implies









That is, mi(s) is continuous on (Fi)i=1,2,3.  
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Lemma 2 proves the existence admission strategies that satisfy the local conditions. The proof
that those strategies are mutual (global) best responses is analogous to that of the two college case.
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